

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Thursday, June 21, 2007 beginning at 8:36 a.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

L.J. Keen, Chair

A. Graham
A. Harvey
C.R. Barnes
M.J. McDill

K. McGee, Commission Assistant Secretary
S. Maislin Dickson, Acting General Counsel
S. Gingras, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisers were: I. Grant, T. Schaubel, K. Lafrenière, B. Howden, K. Scissons, G. Lamarre, D. Howard, G. Schwarz, P. Elder, P. Corcoran, P. Hawley, P. Lahaie, B. Ecroyd, B. Benjamin, A. Bounagui, K. Colvin, G. Crawford, P. Webster, G. Frappier, M. Lord, G. Rzentkowski, P. Wong, S. Oue, A. Erdman, S. Mihok and J. Jin

Other contributors were:

Ontario Power Generation Inc.: M. Elliott, T. Mitchell, W. Robbins and P. Pasquet,
Bruce Power: D. Hawthorne and R. Nixon
Hydro-Québec: M. Désilets and N. Nawyer
New-Brunswick Power Nuclear: G. Thomas
Shield Source Inc.: B. Lynch and P. Hirst
SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.: S. Levesque
Cameco Corporation: G. Grandey, J. Jarrell, T. Gitzel and D. Neuburger
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: B. McGee, B. Kupferschmidt, G. Koroll and Jean-Pierre Létourneau.

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 07-M15, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by K. McGee, Commission Assistant Secretary and S. Gingras, Recording Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting, CMD 07-M14, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.
4. Since the meeting of the Commission held April 11, 2007, Commission Member Documents CMD 07-M14 to CMD 07-M26 were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held April 11, 2007

5. With reference to item 16 of the draft minutes of meeting, the Commission asked for more information on emergency management issues for site-wide operations. CNSC staff reported having been in discussion with Bruce Power and OPG on this topic, and that it will continue to work with them to an overall approach to coordination of site-wide issues at the Bruce site. CNSC staff committed to providing an update on this item at the next Commission meeting.
6. In response to the Commission's request for more information on item 31 of the draft minutes regarding a root cause report, CNSC staff has confirmed that it has not received it, but that it requested OPG to provide an expected date for submission. CNSC staff further noted that OPG has not yet replied to that request.
7. The Commission Members approved the minutes of the April 11, 2007 Commission meeting without modifications.

ACTION

STATUS REPORTS

Significant Development Report

8. The Commission considered the Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2007-3, submitted by CNSC staff as documents CMD 07-M17 and 07-M17.A.
9. With reference to item 4.1.1 of CMD 07-M17 on Pickering A Unit 4 Reactor trip on shutdown system enhancement heat transport low pressure, OPG indicated that, while there was no impact on public or employee safety, it considered any reactor trip to be significant and that it was responding to prevent such an event in the future.

10. OPG explained that the root cause of the event was failure to recognize the impact and consequence to the heat transport system of opening a valve and attempting to recede it. The opening of the valve was done during informal troubleshooting. OPG noted that all troubleshooting activities now require an approved procedure.
11. OPG stated that the root cause report had recently been issued and under review by its management. OPG also indicated that it will make this report available to CNSC staff.
12. In response to a question from the Commission on whether the new procedures for troubleshooting activities had been reviewed with the staff, OPG explained that a managerial stand down was performed with staff on site approximately a week after the event, reinforcing the use of the troubleshooting procedures.
13. With reference to item 4.1.2 of CMD 07-M17.A on Pickering A Units 1 and 4 shutdown because of potential loss of electrical power, OPG explained that the steam barriers involved in this incident have been upgraded, and that a modified feature to restore power to the ventilation systems is being installed and tested.
14. OPG added that a complete review of all steam protection features was also underway, including the loading of the transfer bus mentioned in the SDR. OPG plans to restart the units when this protection is confirmed to be in place. OPG also noted that a root cause investigation was being performed, and that it was committed to determining and correcting the underlying causes of the incident. OPG further declared that the reactors will be maintained in a safe shutdown state until this issue is resolved.
15. In response to a question from the Commission, OPG acknowledged that the barrier deficiencies and the backup power issues should have been identified in 2005, and that it expects the investigation to determine and correct the causes of that delay in reporting.
16. The Commission asked whether this issue applied to other Canadian nuclear generating stations (NGSs). CNSC staff answered that all of the other areas at Pickering A had been investigated, and that other NGSs have been informed through the operational experience (OPEX) program.

17. The Commission enquired on how long the problem may have been present before detection. OPG answered that it assumed the problem to have been present for several years. OPG agreed with the Commission's comment on a reduction of the safety margin with the presence of the issue, and noted that even if the barriers were not there, the operators would be able to shut down the reactor, and contain and cool the fuel manually. OPG also indicated that the significant development report would determine the safety significance of the event.
18. The Commission expects updates on the two significant reports regarding Pickering A, as discussed above, at a future proceeding of the Commission.

ACTION**Status Report on Power Reactors**

19. With reference to CMD 07-M18 on the Status Report on Power Reactors, CNSC staff did not have any additional information or updates.

Annual CNSC Staff Report for 2006 on the Safety Performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry

20. With reference to CMD 07-M19, CNSC staff summarized the annual CNSC staff report for 2006 on the safety performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry.
21. The Commission sought further information from CNSC staff on the targets and actions taken by the licensees to improve the ratings on quality management. CNSC staff responded that the standards are referenced in the licence, and that progress was noted in this area over the previous year. CNSC staff noted that quality management played an important part in the overall safety performance of a plant. CNSC staff added that, regarding Bruce A and B NGS, Bruce Power has the Process and Document Enhancement Project, for which the documentation is reviewed on a regular basis. CNSC staff finds the submitted documentation to be acceptable.
22. The Commission enquired on whether the ratings for emergency preparedness included other parties involved, for example municipalities and provinces. CNSC staff responded that, while CNSC staff's ratings and observations of the emergency management programs are primarily concerned with the licensee's discharge of its obligations, there is a requirement for the licensees

- to have a relationship with the local emergency management capabilities. CNSC staff's evaluations include evaluating the interface with local authorities.
23. The Commission notes that it would be useful to obtain information on broader, key priority areas and broader challenges the power reactor licensees face, either as part of the annual report on power reactors, or as information provided during a Meeting of the Commission.
24. The Commission requested CNSC staff to include trends next to each rating in the next annual report on the safety performance of the Canadian nuclear power industry.
25. The Commission asked for comments from licensees on generic action items. OPG explained that, while some action items have been ongoing for a long time, they have received a great deal of attention. CNSC staff noted that it was also looking for closure on many of these items. CNSC staff also indicated that these items have generally been raised to address matters that typically are connected with some of the more improbable and more severe postulated accidents, and that they are not an indication of the safety of the plant. These action items also present complex technical problems.
26. The Commission stated its expectation that the industry would focus on the closure of the generic action items and requested CNSC staff to report at a future meeting of the Commission.
27. The Commission enquired on the signification of pressure boundary degradation numbers. CNSC staff explained that, while the reporting requirements are uniform across the facilities, the interpretation of these requirements could vary, which might lead to differences in numbers. CNSC staff added that pressure boundary degradations are covered under the program maintenance and equipment fitness for service, and that the ratings given in those program areas contain a broader overview of the maintenance activities carried out by the licensee. Bruce Power responded that it considered that, along with the difference of interpretation, raised standards on pressure boundary certification would lead to an increase in numbers. OPG indicated that the number of units in a station would also have an influence.
28. The Commission considers that more details regarding pressure boundary degradations should be included in next year's report in order to facilitate interpretation.

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29. At the request of the Commission, CNSC staff summarized its activities and licensing processes related to licence applications for new reactors, planned to be constructed at the Bruce and Darlington NGS sites. CNSC staff also confirmed that it expected a site licence application from Energy Alberta Corporation.
30. Regarding the Bruce A and B NGS, Bruce Power summarized the programs implemented and actions taken at the site to respond to regulatory requirements.
31. The Commission asked for clarification on the rate of minimum staff complement. Bruce Power explained that it operated most of the time (54%) above staff complement, and that the periods below complement were for very short periods. CNSC staff concurred with Bruce Power. CNSC staff further noted that the minimum complement rate was significantly higher than at other stations, and that a lower rate would be preferable.
32. In response to comments requested by the Commission, Bruce Power detailed its efforts to increase its number of licensed operators, noting that the time to licensing an operator is of long duration. Bruce Power also stated its commitment to resolve this issue.
33. The Commission sought further information on the venting of the upper power house. Bruce Power explained that the venting has been in place for a number of months. Bruce Power considers that there are no issues associated with venting in the winter. CNSC staff concurred with Bruce Power.
34. The Commission enquired on the Bruce Power training program. Bruce Power indicated that modifications to the program were made following observations of deficiencies made by CNSC staff. CNSC staff commented that its practice is to provide immediate feedback to the licensee after an evaluation, followed by a detailed written report. CNSC staff considers Bruce Power's training program to be acceptable.
35. The Commission asked Bruce Power about any actions taken to ensure the presence of sufficient skilled staff in the future, considering the expected high retirement rate and the potential construction of new nuclear facilities. Bruce Power answered that programs are in place for training new nuclear operators, and that there is a concerted effort to transition knowledge when employees leave the company. Bruce Power added that the nuclear industry has been working with universities in order to train and bring in more people.

36. Regarding the Pickering and Darlington NGS, OPG expressed the view that the nuclear industry is able to hire and attract employees. OPG also confirmed its good relationship with local colleges and universities, and pointed out the existence of apprentice programs to develop trade skills. OPG agreed with Bruce Power's statement on the need to make efforts regarding the transfer of knowledge to other employees.
37. The Commission asked OPG when the planned work related to environmental qualification was going to be completed. OPG answered that work was still ongoing, but that it was not anticipating its completion by the end of the year. In response to comments requested by the Commission, CNSC staff explained that work is planned to be completed by the year 2010, and that work was on schedule and moving along.
38. Regarding the Darlington NGS, the Commission asked comments from OPG about the higher than normal accident rate at Darlington in 2006. OPG explained that aggressive management actions have been put in place, including field observations, a rapid-trending program and increased management oversight on working issues. OPG stated that these measures have since reduced the accident severity rate. OPG added that these accidents did not involve any additional exposure to radiation. OPG further noted that there were no lost time accidents so far in 2007.
39. Regarding the Pickering A NGS, the Commission sought further information on rules-based decision making. OPG explained that this process involves revisions to operating procedures to include new limits and actions. It is a paper based process, and OPG indicated having a controlled documents process to ensure all procedures are updated as necessary. CNSC staff agreed with OPG's actions on this topic.
40. The Commission expressed concerns regarding the numerous unresolved repetitive equipment deficiencies at Pickering A that led to repeat reportable events. CNSC staff explained that, while there are issues with human performance, the facility met the regulatory targets for their liability and the availability of systems important to safety. OPG indicated that early performance issues were common when a unit has been shut down for a long period of time. OPG added that it is currently using a more systematic problem solving process to resolve these issues.

41. The Commission expressed concerns about maintenance backlogs at the Pickering A NGS. In response, OPG noted that, while the maintenance backlogs at Pickering A are above industry standard, there is a downward trend, and the industry standard should be reached by the end of the year 2008. CNSC staff acknowledged OPG's improvement regarding this issue.
42. The Commission sought more information on the Pickering A NGS Units 2 and 3 safe storage project. OPG answered that the project description was being submitted to CNSC staff. CNSC staff indicated that several licence amendments were needed for this project, which will require the Commission's approval.
43. The Commission requested that, when the project is started, OPG and CNSC staff should provide an overall plan of the project, in order for the Commission to have a sense of the different steps involved.
44. The Commission asked for any problems regarding fire protection at the Pickering A and B NGS. OPG responded that Pickering A's fire protection system was upgraded, and that it considers it to be adequate. OPG added that, for the Pickering B NGS, a modification is being installed that should address some particular concerns raised by CNSC staff. CNSC staff confirmed that the concerns are related to a very specific accident scenario and that discussions are still ongoing to obtain resolution. OPG explained that the modification (diesel dedicated firewater pumps) is planned to be installed by the end of the year 2009.
45. Regarding New Brunswick Power (NB Power), this licensee commented that it was committed to continue to be an employer of choice in New Brunswick. NB Power also described the actions taken to hire employees, including contractual commitments with universities and colleges, learning plans for new employees, and hiring new employees before the employee who quit his position leaves.
46. As requested by the Commission in the November 2006 *Record of Proceedings, including Reasons for Decisions* regarding the Gentilly-2 licence renewal, CNSC staff provided an update on the activities at the waste storage area at Gentilly-2. CNSC staff reported that Hydro-Québec believes there is sufficient space to meet operational demands until at least the end of year 2007.

ACTION

47. Regarding the Gently-2 plant, the Commission requested more information on the authorizations to build a new storage area for radioactive waste. Hydro-Québec replied that it was missing the Quebec government order-in-council, which was to be discussed in the Quebec Cabinet on June 27, 2007. Construction is scheduled to begin in August 2007 and end around July 2008. Hydro-Québec stated that there would be sufficient space in the existing storage area to meet demand until construction is completed.
48. Hydro-Québec stated that the problem attracting workers did not apply to skilled workers, who could be transferred from other areas of the company. Hydro-Québec also mentioned that it was in touch with universities for the recruitment of new graduates and interns. Hydro-Québec said that there was a more aggressive recruitment program for control room operators.

Interim Status Reports

49. With reference to CMD 07-M22, CNSC staff presented an interim licensing report on Shield Source Incorporated's (SSI) Class 1B facility located in Peterborough, Ontario. CNSC staff provided an update on the performance of the facility at the approximate midpoint of the current licence period, including a summary of the follow-up activities to the 2004 licence renewal hearing, an overview of compliance activities, and information on the continuing investigation of tritium levels in the immediate area around the facility.
50. The Commission asked for more information on CNSC staff's approach to investigate the tritium contamination levels. CNSC staff provided information on the location of the wells used for sampling, noting that there is a considerable amount of data available, but that it had not yet been fully analyzed.
51. The Commission further asked about the contamination levels over time around the site, considering the high level of tritium emanating from the stack. CNSC staff considers that the source term values should have been fairly constant over the years, since the operational activity at the facility has not changed. CNSC staff is of the view that there are no immediate concerns to the health and safety of the public, considering the low levels of radiological activity measured in the outlying areas and the local residents' well. However, CNSC staff is more concerned with the high levels of activity in the immediate area. CNSC staff further noted that it was waiting for a final report from SSI during the month of July 2007.

52. In response to a question from the Commission, CNSC staff confirmed that tritiated water could run off from the stack and potentially contaminate groundwater. CNSC staff added that a hydrogeologist would be reviewing the issue during the summer 2007.
53. The Commission asked for more information on any food grown near the facility. CNSC staff explained that there is an investigation ongoing to find the cause for an unusual level of tritium in an apple picked up in a tree nearby the facility. CNSC staff further noted that the apples at this location are not being eaten by the nearby residents. SSI further noted that the nearest residence, which is across the street from the facility, did not have a vegetable garden used for household consumption, and that there is no other garden close enough to the facility to warrant sampling and analyzing.
54. In response to comments requested by the Commission on fire protection, SSI indicated that it was concerned about fire safety at the facility, and that it was working diligently with the fire department and CNSC staff to improve fire safety. SSI noted that the ideal solution would be to move to a separate building. SSI added that plans to move the facility had to be cancelled because of several obstacles.
55. The Commission enquired whether CNSC staff was satisfied with the fire suppression measures at the facility. CNSC staff responded that, while it was satisfied with the measures in place, it will request SSI to provide better physical separation between this facility and the adjoining facility in the same building. This issue should be addressed in the remaining licence period.
56. The Commission asked about public information activities. SSI answered that pamphlets are sent to residents every year, informing them of the final estimate of public dose for the year. CNSC staff stated that it considered SSI's public information program to be adequate. CNSC staff suggested SSI to make the environmental monitoring report available on their Web site. SSI noted that it would comply with the request.
57. The Commission noted that a map of the facility and its surroundings, including the location of each well, would have been useful in better understanding the issues related to this facility.

58. With reference to CMD 07-M21, CNSC staff provided an update on reports required by SRB Technologies (SRBT)'s possession licence. CNSC staff indicated that SRBT has submitted clarification and additional information in response to a letter sent by CNSC staff on May 25, 2007 regarding the annual compliance report. CNSC staff reviewed the information and considers it to be acceptable. CNSC staff added that SRBT was following up on a jurisdictional item regarding compliance with Ontario Ministry of Labour and Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC) on conventional safety jurisdiction, and that SRBT was committed to update CNSC staff on any new information.
59. In response to a question from the Commission on this jurisdictional item, CNSC staff explained that it does not consider it to be a significant health and safety issue, but that it wanted to ensure that the licensee was working towards the HRSDC, as opposed to the Ontario, conventional safety requirements.
60. SRBT provided a summary of the recent tritium releases from the facility, and expressed its intention to apply for a resumption of operation at the facility in the near future.
61. The Commission asked for more information on composition of waste in the 18 drums sent for disposal in 2006. SRBT answered that, besides tritium crushed glass from the reclaim or recycling process, the majority of the waste was surface contaminated items such as shoe covers, gloves and other materials used in the facility. SRBT noted that this waste did not result from accidental breakage.
62. The Commission requested comments from SRBT regarding the seemingly high accident rate at the facility. SRBT answered that, while there was only one incident that resulted in lost time, other employees were sent to outpatient facilities as a preventative measure when a serious injury is suspected. SRBT added that every incident, however small it may be, is reported. CNSC staff stated that it was satisfied with SRBT's explanations on this topic.
63. In response to a question from the Commission on the systematic and quantitative analysis, SRBT indicated that all of the background information, the writing and the report was entirely done by SRBT, and some of the data analysis and model analysis was either confirmed or performed by a third party.

64. The Commission asked for clarification regarding handwritten notes found on certain pages of SRBT's report on the systematic and quantitative analysis of tritium sources and their potential contribution to groundwater contamination, dated March 29, 2007. CNSC staff and SRBT confirmed that the handwritten notes referred to by the Commission indicated correct numbers¹.
65. The Commission requested CNSC staff and SRBT to make appropriate corrections to the report and submit an updated version to the Commission².
66. In response to a question from the Commission, CNSC staff explained that it was satisfied with the atmospheric modeling of loadings to the environment, as described in the report.
67. With reference to CMD 07-M20.1, Cameco provided a summary of the April and October 2006 mine inflow events at the Cigar Lake Project. Cameco outlined the changes made to the management structure, attempts made at improving the safety culture, as well as other actions taken to prevent re-occurrence.
68. Cameco stated that it was taking steps to measure safety culture at its various sites and that a third party safety culture assessment for Cigar Lake was scheduled for the near future. Cameco further noted that it was prepared to report to the Commission on the status of the 56 corrective actions identified through the taproot investigations, on its benchmarking findings and on progress regarding the larger safety culture issues at Cigar Lake.
69. With reference to CMD 07-M20, CNSC staff presented a summary of each event, the root cause report and the licensee's response to the investigation findings. CNSC staff also provided an update on the current status of the mine, stating that it is currently in a safe shutdown state and will remain so until all regulatory requirements have been met.

ACTION

¹ The Secretariat of the Commission notes that working copies of the report, which CNSC staff had used in its review of the submitted data, were erroneously provided to the Commission members. SRBT had reported an error regarding the potential source number 35 (see note 2 below) to CNSC staff during a meeting held on April 30, 2007 which was recorded in a letter by CNSC staff dated May 17, 2007.

² On June 27, 2007, SRBT submitted revised pages 39 and 41 of the report to CNSC. These pages correctly indicate that the concentration of tritium from source number 35 would be 400,000 Bq/L instead of 40,000 Bq/L, the loading in that quantity of water would be 0.512 GBq instead of 0.0512 GBq and the maximum impact of potential source 35 would be equal to 5.28% of the total site load in 2006, as opposed to the 0.528%, as originally reported.

70. The Commission expressed concerns that the actions taken by Cameco to date do not address thorough leadership accountability nor licensee responsibility under the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* for the safety of the site.
71. The Commission expressed its view on the issues that, in its opinion, contributed to the events. These included Cameco's failure to recognize the hydrogeological conditions, its lack of management oversight of its workers and consultants, its failure to learn from past experience and its inability to apply any lessons learned, and its poor handling of an emergency situation that breached workers' safety.
72. The Commission further expressed its lack of confidence in Cameco's leadership as a result of these events and as demonstrated by the decisions taken following the events. In the Commission's view, the management decisions lacked sufficient strategic consideration for the protection of the health and safety of persons and the environment.
73. Cameco concurred with the Commission's fundamental statements and further informed the Commission on several initiatives that it has since introduced to its mining site. Cameco assured the Commission of its commitment to address the identified issues and restore confidence in Cameco.
74. With respect to CNSC staff's conclusion that Cameco had not met the regulatory requirements, the Commission asked CNSC staff to describe the nature of these requirements and the authority that CNSC staff has to ensure compliance. CNSC staff provided an overview of the existing licence conditions for contractor management, implementation of the Mine Development and Control Programs and change management. In CNSC staff's view, the events may have been prevented or the consequences may have been less if these requirements had been met. CNSC staff noted that it had taken a number of enforcement actions with the licensee, including providing significant development reports and drafting an Order whose actions Cameco accepted and implemented. CNSC staff reiterated the Commission's initial view regarding these events, that is that the licensee holds the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of its facility.

75. In response to the Commission's enquiry as to what additional measures could be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future, CNSC staff noted there are opportunities for enhanced regulatory control with the consideration of new licence conditions, revisions to programs and procedures, focused CNSC assessments and inspections, the use of hold-points to seek authorization to proceed at key operational stages, and enhanced corporate oversight by Cameco reporting to the Commission as appropriate. CNSC staff also noted that routine inspections and the licensee's current programs are sufficient to ensure the site remains in a safe shutdown state and that any of the limited activities at the site are carried out in safe manner. CNSC staff concluded that it can respond quickly to non-compliance situations at the site as needed, and that, if necessary, the CNSC inspectors and designated officers have the authority to issue orders, including orders to cease operation, and will do so according to well-established procedures.
76. The Commission expects CNSC staff and Cameco to report back to the Commission on the status of the Cigar Lake site at a future Commission proceeding, when appropriate.
77. With reference to CMD 07-M23, CNSC staff presented an interim status report on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Whiteshell Laboratories under a CNSC decommissioning licence. CNSC staff provided a brief description of the facility, compliance activities since the first interim report, and a status of the Phase I decommissioning activities.
78. CNSC staff also provided an update to an event which occurred on May 31, 2007, when a worker found contamination on his hands. CNSC staff stated that the event was determined not to be reportable, since the contamination did not lead to a skin dose in excess of the action level or dose limit. CNSC staff further noted that it was reviewing the follow-up information, but that it was satisfied that the incident did not pose a health risk to the individual.
79. AECL verbally updated the Commission on its activities at the Whiteshell Laboratories since the last interim report.
80. The Commission asked whether there were any work activities significantly behind schedule. AECL answered that, while some activities are behind schedule, the pace of work increased and the work schedule is close to the original plan. CNSC staff indicated that its focus is mostly on health and safety and that schedule is not a priority. However, CNSC staff is planning on examining the impact of a change of scheduling on the quality assurance plan for decommissioning.

ACTION

81. The Commission sought information on the fire protection program. AECL answered that the fire hazard analysis was on schedule, and that the work for completing the fire protection program document was ahead of schedule. CNSC staff stated that it reviewed the action plan and found it acceptable.
82. The Commission asked for information on the actions taken by AECL to bring the quality assurance plan compliant with requirements. AECL answered that it was implementing the revisions to the quality program that CNSC staff has commented on, and that it was anticipating that CNSC staff will find the implementation of the program to be acceptable at the next audit.
83. The Commission enquired about any changes expected regarding integrated safeguards approach. CNSC staff answered that one of the key differences would be that the IAEA will no longer conduct regularly scheduled inspections at the facility, but would move towards short- or no-notice, random inspections. CNSC staff added that it might have to perform its own inspections since its presence at the site during unannounced IAEA inspections would be more difficult to plan.
84. The Commission asked for an update on AECL's relationship with the local communities. AECL responded that the interventions submitted to the CNSC during previous hearings were mostly focused on the local community considering the pace of decommissioning activities to be too slow. Relationships with the community have significantly improved since the announcement of additional funding, which allows the rate of decommissioning activities to increase, with the objective to proceed with full decommissioning of most of the Whiteshell site within an approximate 20 year period rather than 60 years as outlined in the original reference plan. CNSC staff noted that a lot of progress seems to have been made regarding relationships with communities, and that it intends to continue to observe community meetings to ensure that this progress continues.

CNSC Regulatory Document Program: Annual Report 2006-2007

85. With respect to CMD 07-M24, CNSC staff summarized the annual report on the CNSC Regulatory Document Program. CNSC staff also outlined the actions planned to increase the regulatory documents production.

86. In response to a question from the Commission, CNSC staff indicated that it anticipates that more documents would be developed during the year 2007. CNSC staff added that other documents could be combined, depending on the decisions made by the Regulatory Policy Committee.

87. The Commission requests CNSC staff to provide, when they are available, the terms of reference of the Regulatory Policy Committee at a future meeting of the Commission.

ACTION

88. The Commission asked about possible impacts caused by the backlog in producing documents. CNSC staff responded that the regulatory documents provide the regulatory framework necessary for a licensee and CNSC staff to have clear information on the criteria for assessing safety areas. However, there are gaps in the regulatory framework when document production is delayed, which might lead to issues in interpreting the Act and its Regulations.

Closure of the Public Meeting

89. The public meeting closed at 7:48 p.m.

DECISION ITEMS

Amendments to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees Regulations

90. The Commission moved in closed session with CNSC staff to discuss proposed amendments to the *Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Regulations*, as set out in CMD 07-M25.

91. Following its deliberation on the matter, the Commission decided to accept the recommendation of CNSC staff as presented in CMD 07-M25 to proceed with this initiative.

DECISION

Amendments to certain CNSC regulations and Rules of Procedure

92. The Commission moved in closed session with CNSC staff to discuss proposed amendments to certain CNSC Regulations and *Rules of Procedure*, as set out in CMD 07-M26.

93. Following its deliberation on the matter, the Commission decided to accept the recommendation of CNSC staff as presented in CMD 07-M26 to amend certain CNSC regulations and *Rules of Procedure*.

DECISION

Chair

Recording Secretary

Secretary

APPENDIX A

CMD	DATE	File No
07-M14	2007-04-20	(1-3-1-5)
Notice of meeting held on Thursday, June 21, 2007 in Ottawa		
07-M15	2007-06-06	(6.02.02)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Thursday, June 21, 2007		
07-M15.A	2007-06-15	(6.02.02)
Updated agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Thursday, June 21, 2007		
07-M16	2007-06-13	(1-3-1-5)
Approval of minutes of Commission meeting held April 11, 2007		
07-M17	2007-06-01	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report no. 2007-3 for the period of March 28, 2007 to June 1, 2007		
07-M17.A	2007-06-15	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report no. 2007-3 for the period of June 2, 2007 to June 15, 2007		
07-M18	2007-06-05	(1-3-1-5)
Status Report on Power Reactors units for the period of March 27, 2007 to June 5, 2007		
07-M19	2007-06-05	(26-1-0-0-0)
Annual CNSC Staff Report for 2006 on the Safety Performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry		
07-M19.A	2007-05-31	(6.01.07)
Site Security Assessment for the Annual CNSC Staff Report for 2006 on the Safety Performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry – Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available		
07-M20	2007-06-05	(22-C-124-3)
Cameco Corporation – Cigar Lake Project – Root Cause Reports and Outcomes from April 2006 Shaft No.2 Flooding and October 2006 Mine Flooding – Oral presentation by CNSC staff		

07-M20.1 2007-06-05 (1-3-1-7)
Cameco Corporation – Cigar Lake Project – Root Cause Reports and Outcomes from April 2006 Shaft No.2 Flooding and October 2006 Mine Flooding – Oral presentation by Cameco Corporation

07-M21 2007-06-05 (6.02.04)
SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. – Status Report on Reports Required by SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.’s Possession Licence, NSPFPL-13.00/2008 – Oral presentation by CNSC staff

07-M21.1 2007-06-14 (6.02.04)
SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. – Status Report on Reports Required by SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.’s Possession Licence, NSPFPL-13.00/2008 – Oral presentation by SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.

07-M22 2007-06-05 (6.02.04)
Shield Source Inc. – Interim Licensing Report on Shield Source Inc.’s Class IB Nuclear Facility in Peterborough, Ontario

07-M22.A 2007-06-05 (6.02.04)
Shield Source Inc. – Interim Licensing Report on Shield Source Inc.’s Class IB Nuclear Facility in Peterborough, Ontario – Contains prescribed information and is not publicly available

07-M23 2007-06-05 (37-20-15-0)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited – Interim Status Report on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited’s Whiteshell Laboratories under CNSC Nuclear Research and Test Establishment Decommissioning Licence

07-M23.A 2007-05-28 (6.02.04)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited – Interim Status Report on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited’s Whiteshell Laboratories under CNSC Nuclear Research and Test Establishment Decommissioning Licence – Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available

07-M24 2007-06-07 (1-8-8-0)
CNSC Regulatory Document Program: Annual Report 2006-2007

07-M25 2007-05-22 (20-1-18-11)
Amendments to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees Regulations (Miscellaneous Program) – Contains Cabinet Confidence documents and is not publicly available

07-M26 2007-05-22 (20-1-18-1/2/3/5/10/12)
Amendments to certain CNSC regulations and Rules of Procedure – Contains Cabinet Confidence documents and is not publicly available