



Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety  
Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on  
September 16, 2020

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) meeting held virtually on Wednesday, September 16, 2020 beginning at 9:00 A.M. The President and a limited number of CNSC staff participated from the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario. The meeting was open to the public to attend via the CNSC's website and most participants participated via the Zoom™ platform.

Present:

R. Velshi, President  
T. Berube  
S. Demeter  
M. Lacroix  
S. McKinnon

M. Leblanc, Secretary  
L. Thiele, Senior General Counsel  
C. Moreau and W. Khan, Recording Secretaries

CNSC staff advisors were: G. Frappier, L. Casterton, Y.C. Liu, T. Tabikh, H. Davis, M. Hornof, W. Khan, K. McGee, H. Robertson, T. Panichevska, K. Owen-Whitred, C. Moses, R. Jammal, S. Faille, G. Lamarre, C. Purvis, K. McAllister, E. Leader, M. Broeders and B. Carroll

Other contributors were:

- Ontario Power Generation: J. Vecchiarelli, R. Geofroy and M. Griffiths
- Bruce Power: M. Burton
- New Brunswick Power: J. Nouwens
- CancerCare Manitoba: D. Dombrosky
- Suncor Energy Inc.: D. Nelson

#### Constitution

1. With the notice of meeting in Commission Member Document [\(CMD\) 20-M18](#) having been properly given, and all permanent Commission members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.
2. Since the Commission meeting held June 17 – 18, 2020, [CMD 20-M19 to CMD 20-M21](#), and [CMD 20-M26 to CMD 20-M30](#) were distributed to members. These documents are further detailed in Appendix A of these minutes.

e-Docs 6384211 (Word)

e-Docs 6458152 (PDF)

### Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, [CMD 20-M19.A](#), was adopted as presented.

### Chair and Secretary

4. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. Leblanc, Secretary and C. Moreau and W. Khan, Recording Secretaries.

### Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held June 17 – 18, 2020

5. The Commission approved the minutes of the June 17 – 18, 2020 Commission meeting.

### STATUS REPORT ON POWER REACTORS

6. With reference to [CMD 20-M20](#), which included the Status Report on Power Reactors, CNSC staff presented the following updates:
  - Bruce NGS Unit 2 was at 81% of full power (FP) due to delays in fuelling; and
  - Pickering NGS Unit 1 was at 77% of FP; and
  - The heavy water spill at the Pickering NGS Unit 1 had been cleaned and the primary heat transport system had been repaired.
7. CNSC staff provided further details regarding the effects the COVID-19 pandemic has had on operations and added that on-site NPP inspections have resumed to normal and are no longer just focused on the licensees' implementation of their business continuity programs.
8. With respect to the heavy water spill at Pickering NGS, the Commission requested details regarding the mitigation measures in place to prevent potential groundwater contamination. An OPG representative responded that the containment structure was designed with several feet of concrete to contain any radioactivity released within that structure and added that water was transported through enclosed piping networks to prevent groundwater contamination.

9. Further on that topic, the Commission asked for information with respect to the volume of the spill, the tritium levels, and worker uptakes. An OPG representative responded that the leak was from the fuel machine's deuterium oxide supply system and that the volume of heavy water was approximately 31 m<sup>3</sup>. The OPG representative added that while recovering the heavy water, there were no dose exceedances or unplanned uptakes
10. Asked about the root cause of the pressure gauge failure, the OPG representative responded that a cracked pipe, approximately one-inch thick, had sheared due to a pressure boundary failure.
11. The Commission asked whether the frequency of failures of fuelling machines was a normal part of operations or if it was a result of aging equipment. An OPG representative responded that OPG has a robust preventative maintenance program for the 12 operating fuelling machines to ensure that they are reliable and that that equipment reliability for the fuel machine system was currently the highest it has ever been.
12. For the purposes of public knowledge, the Commission enquired about why the Pickering NGS licence expires on August 31, 2028 while the licence does not allow for operations beyond December 31, 2024. CNSC staff responded that, as per its licence conditions, the Pickering NGS is only allowed to operate until December 31, 2024, after which OPG will be required to carry out several activities to place the reactors into safe storage.
13. With respect to the Province of Ontario's statement of its intent to extend operations of Pickering NGS, the Commission asked if the CNSC has received a formal licence application from OPG. CNSC staff responded that, although the provincial government had indicated its desire to extend operations of Pickering NGS, OPG would be required to apply for a licence amendment prior to doing so and that OPG had not yet submitted a formal licence amendment application to the CNSC. A request for extension would require a licence amendment and would require a decision of the Commission through the public hearing process.
14. Further on that question, an OPG representative submitted that it was currently exploring the option of extending Pickering NGS past December 31, 2024 and added that it was a licensing requirement in place to notify the CNSC of the planned shutdown dates by the end of 2022.

15. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission requested information regarding the self-isolation process for contractors travelling to the Point Lepreau NGS in support of the ongoing outage. An NB Power representative responded that contractors who arrived for the Point Lepreau NGS outage from outside the Atlantic Provinces were required to self-isolate for fourteen days prior to entering the NGS. Additionally, as part of the self-isolation process, contractors were required to get COVID-19 testing upon arrival, throughout the fourteen days, and at the end of the self-isolation period.
16. Asked if the duration of the ongoing planned outage had increased as a result of the additional measures in place, an NB Power representative responded that the duration of the outage was not extended. CNSC staff added 18 field inspections were planned over the course of the outage and that the inspections would focus on workers' adherence to COVID-19 protocols in the area of radiation protection, worker protection and work procedures.

#### EVENT INITIAL REPORTS (EIRs)

##### CancerCare Manitoba: Exposure above regulatory limit of a non-Nuclear Energy Worker

17. With reference to [CMD 20-M27](#), CNSC staff presented information regarding an event that involved a radiological dose to an individual exceeding the regulatory dose limit for a member of the public.<sup>1</sup> CNSC staff submitted that, on March 10, 2020, the radiation safety officer (RSO) at CancerCare Manitoba notified CNSC staff that a radiation oncologist working for CancerCare Manitoba had received a dose of 3.54 mSv based on the dosimeter results from the fourth calendar quarter of 2019. CNSC staff added that, as none of CancerCare Manitoba's employees were designated as nuclear energy workers (NEW), the regulatory dose limit for a member of the public of 1 mSv per year was applicable.
18. CNSC staff reported that the licensee launched an investigation as to the possible causes for the high dose reported, which included requesting the dosimetry service provider to investigate the dosimeter reading. CNSC staff submitted that CancerCare Manitoba asserted that the entire dose was attributed to the caretaking by the employee of a family member undergoing a nuclear medicine procedure and was not related to licensed

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<sup>1</sup> The effective dose limit is 1 mSv in a one-year dosimetry period for a member of the public, [SOR/2000-203](#), subsection 13(1).

activities. CNSC staff added that its independent calculation, completed on May 21, 2020, indicated that 1.39 mSv of the reported 3.54 mSv could be attributed to the caretaking activities, based on the information provided by CancerCare Manitoba. CNSC staff accepted CancerCare Manitoba's assertion that this was most likely a non-occupational dose and that no corrective action was required.

19. CNSC staff reported that the employee's work activities were immediately restricted so as not to further contribute to the person's radiation dose. The employee was authorized by the CNSC to return to unrestricted work on June 1, 2020. CNSC staff added that the affected employee experienced no health effects from this exposure and that none were expected.
20. The Commission enquired whether the affected employee had left the CancerCare Manitoba campus with the employee's dosimeter for the caretaking of a family member. The CancerCare Manitoba representative reported that the caretaking by the employee took place in a separate facility located on the same facility grounds and that the employee had the dosimeter with them at that time. The CancerCare Manitoba representative added that CancerCare Manitoba's doctors occasionally have to go to the other facility to assess patients but that they should remove their dosimeter when on any personal business outside of the CancerCare Manitoba campus.
21. Asked about the controls in place for CancerCare Manitoba's dosimeters, the CancerCare Manitoba representative informed that CancerCare Manitoba staff members were required to wear their dosimeters whenever they were attending a radiation area at CancerCare Manitoba and were instructed to leave their dosimeters at the CancerCare Manitoba centre when leaving it. The CancerCare Manitoba representative added that a badge rack was available in the Radiation Therapy Department but that the radiation oncologists generally kept their badges in their offices.
22. The CancerCare Manitoba representative also reported that, in this instance, the investigation determined that the radiation oncologist was taking their dosimeter home in the evenings and was reminded of the proper procedure in respect of the storing dosimeters.
23. The Commission enquired about whether CancerCare Manitoba's investigation considered if it was a widespread practice for its staff members to bring home their dosimeter. The CancerCare Manitoba representative reported that staff members had initial radiation safety training to inform them about the expectation of radiation protection with regards to their

dosimeters and that a refresher training session was scheduled every two years. The CancerCare Manitoba representative added that CancerCare Manitoba will be including in that refresher training session a reminder to all staff member of the importance to leave their dosimeters at work.

24. Regarding the dosimeters, the Commission asked CNSC staff to speak to their accuracy and calibration. CNSC staff explained that dosimeters had to meet regulatory requirements which prescribed different criteria for ensuring accuracy and precision. CNSC staff added that dosimeters were reset before being reused to ensure that there were no remaining exposure readings and that they were also subjected to routine performance testing.
25. The Commission enquired about whether there was any indication that would suggest the presence of a static dose resulting from potential contamination. The CancerCare Manitoba representative reported that the Dosimetry Services confirmed that the dosimeter was working properly.
26. The Commission requested CNSC staff to provide the Commission with the dosimetry calculations.
27. As CNSC staff mentioned that CancerCare Manitoba had not requested any dose change related to this event, the Commission enquired whether CancerCare Manitoba would be requesting a dose change at the National Dose Registry to keep its occupational dose records accurate. The CancerCare Manitoba representative stated that CancerCare Manitoba would look into requesting a dose change for the non-occupational portion of the employee's dose. CNSC staff indicated that it would review the request and approve it after confirming its accuracy. The Commission noted the importance of keeping accurate occupational dose records and expects CancerCare Manitoba to proceed with the dose change request relatively to this event.

**ACTION**  
**by**  
**November**  
**2020**

Suncor Energy Inc.: Fire at Suncor Energy Inc. Tar Island location, near Fort McMurray

28. With reference to [CMD 20-M29](#), CNSC staff presented information regarding an event that involved a fire that occurred at the Suncor Energy Inc. (Suncor) Tar Island site, located near Fort McMurray, Alberta, on the evening of August 14, 2020. CNSC staff submitted that on August 15, 2020, the RSO for the site notified CNSC staff that five of the 17 nuclear gauges present at the site were close to the area where the fire occurred, with none being directly involved in the fire.

29. CNSC staff reported that the licensee was investigating the cause of the fire and that safety barriers were maintained to ensure that the nuclear gauges could not be accessed until their condition was fully assessed. CNSC staff added that, although the licensee has not yet been able to safely access those five nuclear gauges to perform a full assessment, information gathered through visual verification and radiation surveys did not reveal any signs of damage to the nuclear gauges and no elevated radiation levels were detected. CNSC staff added that it had no concerns with respect to the safety of persons or the environment, as the measured dose rates were within background levels.
30. CNSC staff reported that Suncor indicated that a qualified third party will come to the Tar Island site to assess the condition of all five potentially affected nuclear gauges when the site returns to a safe state. CNSC staff also reported that Suncor would update CNSC staff as new information becomes available.
31. Asked to provide additional information on the gauges, the Suncor representative reported that Suncor was recently able to access two of the five nuclear gauges and that Suncor was able to confirm that those two nuclear gauges had not been exposed to any heat and had not been damaged by the fire. The Suncor representative added that only the condition of the three remaining gauges needed to be fully assessed.
32. The Commission enquired about the specifications for heat tolerance of the nuclear sources used in the gauges. CNSC staff stated that fixed nuclear gauges were certified by CNSC staff and that there were also specific requirements for the sealed source inside the gauges. CNSC staff added that testing requirements included fires up to 800 degrees Celsius for a short amount of time. CNSC staff also added that, depending on the design, nuclear gauges could be damaged by fire if their lead shielding melted and expanded causing a leak which could then be a radiation hazard. The Commission was satisfied by the information provided on this subject.
33. The Commission asked whether the nuclear gauges were required to go through a risk assessment with respect to external hazards. CNSC staff explained that the nuclear gauges' designs require a certification from the CNSC and that the sealed sources were also designed to resist many of the events that could occur. CNSC staff added that those devices were also used and accepted internationally. CNSC staff further added that licensees had to perform ongoing verification to ensure that the sources were intact and that they were operating as designed.

34. Asked for information regarding Suncor's fire management program, the Suncor representative reported that Suncor had emergency response plans in place at each of its sites to deal with any events. The Suncor representative added that, despite fires being uncommon, Suncor would investigate any events and that lessons learned from those investigations would be implemented to prevent recurrence.
35. The Commission enquired about explanations of the requirement to have fire protection systems in relative proximity to fixed nuclear gauges. CNSC staff reported that there were no regulatory requirements for fire suppression system regarding nuclear substances and radiation devices and that the design of the devices had to ensure safety, regardless of the conditions that the devices might encounter during their lifetime. CNSC staff added that licensees were required to have procedures in place for dealing with fires, spills and any other events that could occur. CNSC staff verified that those programs were in place.

#### UPDATE ON AN ITEM FROM A PREVIOUS COMMISSION PROCEEDING

##### Suncor Energy Inc.: Update on Suncor Energy Inc. MacKay River fire incident

36. With reference to [CMD 20-M30](#), CNSC staff presented an update regarding an event that involved a fire that occurred at the Suncor's MacKay River site, located near Fort McMurray, Alberta, on December 6, 2019. CNSC staff submitted that this event was verbally reported to the Commission at the [December 12, 2019 public meeting](#)<sup>2</sup> and that, as reported during that meeting, the condition of the four nuclear gauges at the site had not yet been assessed, as the licensee needed to secure the site prior to allowing access to the nuclear gauges.
37. CNSC staff reported that on December 21, 2019, a third-party radiation consultant assessed the damage caused by the fire and reported evidence that some lead shielding had melted and escaped the source holder with the highest radiation field around the nuclear gauges measured at 60  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$ . CNSC staff added that four of the gauges were safely removed on January 16 and 17, 2020 by the third-party radiation consultant, and the fifth one on July 30, 2020. CNSC staff also reported that the total exposure received by the two technicians involved in the removal

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<sup>2</sup> CNSC, *Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on December 11–12, 2019*, December 2019.

activities was 199  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$  and 175  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$ , which would result in well below the 1 mSv regulatory limit for members of the public.

38. CNSC staff specified that Suncor was in the process of installing new nuclear gauges and that CNSC staff was satisfied with Suncor's response to this event and considered the event closed.
39. Asked by the Commission whether the nuclear gauges would be returned to the manufacturer for evaluation to potentially improve the design, CNSC staff did not believe that it would be the case as the third-party contractor removed only the dry well containing the nuclear sources for disposal. The Commission is of the view that providing feedback to the manufacturer could be a learning opportunity if something unexpected is found during the removal.
40. The Commission asked for submissions about the requirements in place for firefighters to carry dosimeters when they intervene where nuclear devices or gauges are present. CNSC staff explained that the fixed nuclear gauges were either in vessels or on pipes and that the dose around those gauges was low. CNSC staff added that it would be its expectation that licensees would take any necessary measures to ensure safety and that licensees were required to have a radiation survey meter available to be able to measure the radiation dose, if needed.
41. The Commission acknowledged Suncor for reporting promptly and doing the right remediation actions and asked CNSC staff whether there were additional actions that it would have expected Suncor to carry out. CNSC staff acknowledged that, from CNSC staff's perspective, Suncor had a robust regulatory program and that Suncor responded well to the two separate fire events. CNSC staff's opinion was that Suncor had done everything it could in these situations and CNSC staff concluded that there had been no risk to people or to the environment following the two fire events.
42. Following the discussion about the use of lead as a shielding material in nuclear gauges, CNSC staff undertook to provide additional information on the request from the Commission for a physical explanation of the use of lead in the encapsulation of the source.

**ACTION**  
**by**  
**November**  
**2020**

## INFORMATION ITEMS

### CNSC Oversight of Nuclear Power Plants Maintenance Programs

43. With reference to [CMD 20-M21](#), CNSC staff provided an information update to the Commission on CNSC staff's regulatory oversight of maintenance programs for NPPs across Canada. CNSC staff submitted that regulatory oversight of the licensees' maintenance programs includes inspections, assessments and evaluation of the maintenance related safety performance indicators (SPIs).
44. The Commission enquired as to whether limited-onsite oversight activities have impacted the overall effectiveness of the inspections. CNSC staff responded that with respect to maintenance, CNSC staff recently completed a remote type-II inspection at Point Lepreau and expressed that, with the exception of items that needed physical verification, all other items of the inspection were verified in an effective manner with little or no changes from previous onsite inspections.
45. Asked whether CNSC staff foresee a growing backlog of maintenance activities at the NPPs due to COVID-19, CNSC staff responded that there are a number of indicators in place from a regulatory perspective to assess whether there is an upward trend in the maintenance backlogs. CNSC staff further submitted that these indicators included quarterly reporting as well as daily monitoring of backlogs of performance indicators.
46. Representative of Bruce Power, OPG and NB Power reported that there was no increase in their backlog of maintenance activities due to COVID-19 and confirmed that they do not foresee an upward trend moving forward.
47. The Commission requested information about how CNSC staff delineate which components need to be inspected. CNSC staff responded that there are various levels of hierarchy for critical and non-critical safety related components and are differentiated based on their safety significance. CNSC staff further submitted that the selection of which components need to be inspected depends on the safety significance required for that specific component.
48. The Commission noted the numerous safety performance indicators (SPIs) and requested information on how licensees, on a daily basis, track the SPIs related to maintenance. An NB Power representative responded that NB Power tracks approximately 45 performance indicators on a monthly basis and

added that the equipment reliability index is one of the comprehensive indicators, and include elements such as safety systems performance, reliability, planned outages, long-term plans and the overall health of the safety systems. A Bruce Power representative responded that all NPPs across Canada follow the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) standards for maintenance.

49. The Commission asked whether plant reliability is taken into consideration when calculating the plant output. An NB Power representative submitted that plant reliability and plant output are heavily intertwined as the whole station has a safety connotation to the operation of the reactor.
50. The Commission enquired as to whether the CNSC consulted with CANDU Owners Group (COG) when adopting the criteria for collecting SPI 14, 15 and 16. CNSC staff responded that prior to publishing [REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants](#),<sup>3</sup> CNSC staff consulted with industry and it was decided that the CNSC would accept only those SPIs from the COG Equipment Reliability Index Guidelines (ERI Guidelines) that were safety-related and could be adapted as part of REGDOC 3.1.1. CNSC staff added that the title of the SPIs can be very broad and it is the criteria on how to collect those SPIs which provide details.
51. The Commission asked for information about how the licensees estimate the life expectancy of new custom parts and equipment. A Bruce Power representative responded that the estimation from manufacturer's specification would be the initial estimate and added that once the part was installed, more accurate data would be used for future estimations.
52. An NB Power representative submitted that as part of preventative maintenance, one of the key elements NB Power does is develop a technical basis for all components. The NB Power representative further submitted that the technical basis looks into the component's materials as well as the operating experience that industry has to prevent any degradation.
53. An OPG representative submitted that in addition to what Bruce and NB Power have reported, OPG has invested a large amount of resources in its monitoring diagnostic systems, which use remote monitoring to detect degradation in its early stages. The OPG representative added that OPG is also moving its focus

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<sup>3</sup> Regulatory Documents REGDOC-3.1.1, *Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants*, Version 2, CNSC, April 2016.

away from time-based preventative monitoring (PM) and focusing on condition based PM which allows OPG to perform maintenance activities on parts based on their actual condition.

54. The Commission requested clarification with respect to the five-year baseline compliance plans and enquired whether compliance verification activities overlap with the annual compliance plan that is developed. CNSC staff responded that the five-year baseline compliance plan is an overall strategy that is developed for each facility whereas the annual compliance plans are extracted from the five-year plan, and then take into account what detailed activities the licensee is carrying out in a specific year.
55. The Commission asked if periodic inspections of containments components included the primary heat transport system. CNSC staff responded that CNSC staff have two primary programs with respect to periodic inspection programs - one which covers the pressure boundary components and the other which covers the containment components.
56. The Commission requested information on whether NGS operators are looking into long term issues related to staffing turnover and supply chain if the COVID-19 pandemic is prolonged for a longer than expected duration. An NB Power representative submitted that NB Power had to hone in on activities that were critical to safe and continued operations. An OPG representative stated that OPG has not relaxed any of its standards and intend to meet all its targets for the year. The OPG representative added that OPG has teams in place that are working on long-term plans should the pandemic prolong. A Bruce Power representative submitted that with the amount of work taking place onsite, Bruce Power's biggest challenge has been ensuring that workers adhere to physical distancing protocols.
57. The Commission asked whether CNSC inspectors have access to more licensee data than they did prior to COVID-19. CNSC staff responded that prior to the pandemic, CNSC inspectors had full access to licensees' computers and databases, and that, since the start of the pandemic, CNSC staff were actively working on getting remote access through security fobs. CNSC staff added that performance indicator data and plant information system data has been used successfully to conduct control room inspections remotely.

58. The Commission wishes to express its appreciation for a very detailed presentation as well as for the quality of responses provided during the question period. The Commission anticipates that CNSC staff will provide similar presentations in other technical areas of interest to the Commission in the future.

Status of the Designated Officer Program: 2019

59. With reference to [CMD 20-M26](#), which includes an update on the Designated Officer (DO) Program, CNSC staff presented the following information:
- The number of DOs by title of office to carry out specific authorities of lower-risk activities.
  - The total number of DO authorities carried out in the different directorates and divisions in 2019 compared to previous years.
  - CNSC staff initiated DO Program Improvement Initiatives to ensure that the DO program continues to be a key and effective component of the CNSC's licensing and compliance framework.
  - The impact of COVID-19 in relation to DO activities.
60. Asked for information about the training requirements for DOs, CNSC staff explained that the DO training program included several aspects, particularly briefings with CNSC's Legal Services, Secretariat and the Division of Regulatory Improvement and Major Project Management, on-line self learning, and in-class training of half a day or a day in length, depending on how often DOs were expected to issue decisions or orders. CNSC staff added that completed training was recorded but that no exams were administered. CNSC staff added that DO training included self-learning to become familiar with the procedural documents related to the authorities and communication with more experienced DOs for knowledge and experience sharing. CNSC staff also added that the training program was not a statutory requirement and that DOs can exercise their authority as soon as they were appointed to a position having a DO designation.
61. The Commission enquired about the time required to train and certify a DO in a designated position. CNSC staff reported that the DO designations came with positions where the Commission designated authorities. CNSC staff added that it took in the order of one month to complete all of the steps depending on scheduling and availability.

62. Further on the DO training program, the Commission asked whether CNSC staff interacted with other regulatory bodies internationally in order to improve the DO program. CNSC staff indicated that its DO program underwent international reviews and concluded that the DO program was unique to Canada with respect to the powers granted to the DOs by the Commission and that it was praised internationally for its functionality. CNSC staff added that nationally, Public Health Agency of Canada contacted CNSC staff to establish a similar program with respect to the capability of issuing administrative monetary penalties (AMPs). CNSC staff further added that it was also always looking for opportunities to improve the program.
63. The Commission asked about whether there was a reason for the apparent trend with regard to the decreasing number of AMPs issued in the last three years. CNSC staff responded that the CNSC's threshold for issuing AMPs had not changed and that the issuance of less AMPs does not represent decreased regulatory scrutiny. Rather, AMPs are one of several enforcement tools available to DOs in matters of licensee non-compliance and DOs use a graded approach to determine which enforcement tool should be used.
64. In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission enquired whether CNSC staff had a process in place to quickly replace a DO, should one become unavailable. CNSC staff explained that the DO program was structured as a pyramid of authority where, if a DO became unavailable, the person directly above within the hierarchy of DOs was able to carry out the same authorities. CNSC staff added that the Vice Presidents had all the authorities of their respective branches, allowing for continuous exercise of authorities.
65. Further on the consequences of the COVID 19 pandemic, the Commission asked whether CNSC's information technology (IT) infrastructure was effectively supporting employees working from home to ensure smooth operation. CNSC staff reported that it had to strengthen, improve and augment the capacity of its IT systems for remote connection in the early days of the pandemic and that it now had more than enough capacity for the entire organization to be connecting and working remotely on a regular basis. CNSC staff added that it also added redundancy by modernizing a redundant system which was now available in case of challenges with the existing system.

Closure of the Public Meeting

66. The public meeting closed at 3:30 P.M. These minutes reflect both the [public meeting itself](#) and the Commission's decisions taken as a result of the meeting.



\_\_\_\_\_  
Recording Secretary

07-01-2021

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Date



\_\_\_\_\_  
Recording Secretary

07-01-2021

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**Leblanc,  
Marc**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary

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07-01-2021

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Date

APPENDIX A

CMD	Date	e-Docs No.
20-M19	2020-09-02	6346810
Agenda of the Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to be held remotely on Wednesday, September 16, 2020		
20-M19.A	2020-09-15	6379760
Revised agenda of the Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to be held remotely on Wednesday, September 16, 2020		
20-M28	2020-09-16	6380790
Approval of the Minutes of Commission Meeting held on June 17 and 18, 2020		
20-M20	2020-09-10	6378260
Status Report Status Report on Power Reactors  Submission from CNSC Staff		
20-M21	2020-09-08	6375158
Information Items CNSC Oversight of Nuclear Power Plants Maintenance Programs  Presentation from CNSC Staff		
20-M26	2020-09-09	6357298
Status of the Designated Officer Programs: 2019  Presentation from CNSC Staff		
20-M27	2020-09-03	6370305
Event Initial Reports  CancerCare Manitoba: Exposure above regulatory limit of a non-Nuclear Energy Worker  Written submission from CNSC Staff		
20-M29	2020-09-03	6373150
Event Initial Reports  Suncor Energy Inc.: Fire at Suncor Tar Island location, near Fort McMurray  Written submission from CNSC Staff		

20-M30	2020-09-15	6379667
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding		
Suncor Energy Inc.: Update on MacKay River Fire incident (Action item #20866 from December 11 and 12, 2019 Commission Meeting)		
Written submission from CNSC Staff		