

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, February 4, 2004 beginning at 3:00 p.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

L.J. Keen, Chair

C.R. Barnes

Y.M. Giroux

A. Graham

M.J. McDill

M.A. Leblanc, Secretary

K.M. Moore, Senior Counsel

C.N. Taylor, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisers were:

I. Grant, K. Lafrenière, R. Lojk, H. Rabski, A. Alwani, J. Blyth, K. Scissons, R. Stenson, R. Barker, P. Hawley, A. Nicic, J. Cameron, G. Smith, P. Webster, T. Schaubel, T. Viglasky, M. Burton and D. Chaput.

Other contributors were:

- Bruce Power Inc.: D. Hawthorne
- AECL: J.P. Labrie

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The agenda, CMD 04-M2.B, was adopted as presented.

DECISION

Chair and Secretary

2. The President took the Chair and the Secretary of the Commission acted as Secretary of the meeting with C.N. Taylor acting as recording secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting having been properly given and a quorum of Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.
4. Since the meeting of the Commission held November 26 and 27, 2003, Commission Member Documents CMD 04-M1 to CMD 04-M10 had been distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held November 26 and 27, 2003

5. The Members approved the minutes of the November 26 and 27, 2003 Commission meeting (reference CMD 04-M3) without change.

DECISIONSignificant Development Report

6. Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2004-1 (CMD 04-M4) was submitted by staff. Staff added the following information that arose since the SDR was published:
 - Bruce Power has announced its intent to: assess the feasibility of restarting Units 1 and 2 at Bruce A NGS; evaluate the cost of refurbishing Bruce B NGS to extend its operating life; and examine the possibility of constructing a new power reactor at the Bruce NGS site.
 - Ontario Power Generation (OPG) is seeking an amendment of its licences to reflect a proposed change in its organizational structure for its Pickering B and Darlington NGSs. Staff is currently reviewing the potential effects of the change on safety and will report any significant findings to the Commission.
 - Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) - With reference to section 4.1.2 of the SDR (concerning possible IGSCC observed at Hydro-Quebec's Gentilly-2 NGS), staff corrected the record concerning when OPG, Bruce Power and New Brunswick Power were notified of the potential problem and requested to provide information on their respective facilities. The notice and request for information was made on December 31, 2003, rather than on January 12, 2004, as indicated in the SDR.
7. With reference to section 4.1.1 of the SDR, the Members sought further detail on the reported metal loss that has occurred on the ligaments in 3 of the 8 Bruce B NGS steam generators. Staff stated that the cause was flow-assisted corrosion of the carbon steel divider plates in the generators. Staff noted that similar problems have not been observed in other Canadian reactors and is uncommon elsewhere. Staff added that although the exact nature of the problem is not known, staff is satisfied that the structural repairs and water chemistry changes made by Bruce Power have

mitigated the problem for the remaining projected life of the steam generators. Bruce Power added that it has carried out detailed inspections of its other boilers and is satisfied that the problem is confined to the 3 generators at Unit 8.

8. In response to follow-up questions, Bruce Power and staff stated that, in addition to installing structural supports and adjusting the chemistry in the affected generators, some unsupported tubes were plugged as a precaution. Staff noted that the number of tubes plugged does not pose a safety concern. Increased inspections are being carried out at the Unit 8 steam generators which have since been returned to operating service.
9. With reference to section 4.1.5 of the SDR (concerning the positive power coefficient at the MAPLE reactors at AECL's Chalk River Laboratories), the Members sought further information on the status of CNSC staff's review of AECL's proposed design change and safety assessment (identified in the SDR as to be completed by the end of January 2004). Staff responded that its review was completed on January 17, 2004 and, as a result, further questions on the safety analysis were raised with AECL. AECL has responded to those questions and staff expects to complete its review by February 13, 2004. Staff will provide a further SDR on the matter at the Commission meeting scheduled for March 24, 2004.
10. Further in regard to the reported positive power coefficient at the MAPLE reactors, the Members questioned what would be the implications of the proposed changes to the trip parameters. AECL responded that the proposed additional trips in the safety system would be for low-power operations (i.e., to overcome the effect of the small positive power coefficient with the initial core on the loss of regulation event) and that these would be manually switched out above a certain power level. AECL added that the changes involve physical rather than programming changes.

ACTION

Status Report on Power Reactors

11. With reference to CMD 04-M5, staff provided the following updates to the status of power reactors since the status report was published:
 - Bruce A Unit 3 - staff approved operation to 87% of full power on January 30, 2004. On February 3, 2004, staff further authorized Unit 3 to increase to 92.5% of full power (maximum electrical output). Also on February 3, 2004,

the unit was shut down as a result of a heat transport leak, the source of which is currently being investigated.

- Bruce B Unit 8 – returned to full power operation on January 30, 2004.
- Bruce B Unit 5 – shutdown on January 31, 2004 to make various repairs. The unit is currently in the process of restarting and resynchronization is anticipated on February 5, 2004.
- Pickering B Unit 8 – shutdown on January 26, 2004 to repair the uninterruptible power supply and returned to service on February 1, 2004. The unit subsequently shutdown due to boiler level control problems and is again restarting with projected resynchronization on February 5, 2004.

Criteria for Preparing Significant Development Reports (SDRs)

12. During the Commission Meeting on February 26, 2003, the Commission requested staff to prepare criteria for reporting to the Commission on significant developments¹. With reference to CMD 03-M68, staff presented its proposed criteria and noted that Operations Branch has also prepared procedures that will ensure consistency of content and timely reporting to the Commission of significant developments.
13. With reference to Annex A of proposed SDR criteria (CMD 03-M68), the Members sought clarification of what is meant by a “serious illness” as opposed to a “serious injury”. In response, staff explained that, in this context, an “injury” would be the result of an acute event, whereas an “illness” would be, for example, the result of a long-term exposure to a workplace hazard that results in significant lost time.
14. With reference to Annex C of the proposed SDR criteria, the Members questioned why “work disruptions caused by a workers’ strike” appears only in the criteria for the nuclear cycle and facilities service lines, and not for the power reactor service lines. In response, staff noted that, while such a work disruption would be addressed under the secondary criteria for the power reactor service line, the criteria will be adjusted to make this explicit for all Operations Branch service lines.

ACTION

¹ Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Meeting held Wednesday February 26, 2003, ref. paragraph 19

15. Noting that SDRs are normally presented at regularly scheduled meetings of the Commission, the Members sought and received assurances from staff that the Commission (and the public) would be informed immediately at any other time should the seriousness of the development or other circumstances warrant. Staff noted that it will need to exercise judgment in this regard, rather than relying on a defined set of criteria. Staff further noted that there is a clear process for the timely notification of the Commission in the event of an emergency.
16. The Members, recognizing that SDRs can create perceptions about licensee performance, requested that the staff's reports, in addition to being complete and factual, be thoughtful with respect to how they may be understood and interpreted by other interested parties.

Second Annual Status Report on Unlicensed Uranium Tailings Management Sites

17. With reference to CMD 04-M6 and CMD 04-M6.A, staff provided a summary of the regulatory status of 19 tailings management sites associated with the former operation of uranium mines in Canada. The licensing of the sites was initially discussed by the Members at the Commission Meeting held on December 13 and 14, 2001². At that meeting, the Commission directed staff to report annually on the progress being made to bring those sites under CNSC licences. The first status report was presented at the Commission meeting held on January 15, 2003³.
18. Staff will continue to provide the Commission with annual reports on the status of exemptions for unlicensed uranium mines in Canada.
19. Staff reported that: 15 of the tailings sites are now under CNSC licence; an application for a licence has been received for one of the remaining sites; and letters of intent to apply for a licence have been received for the remaining 3 sites.
20. Staff provided a brief description of each of the sites and the licensing activities completed or planned.

ACTION

² Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Meeting held on December 13 and 14, 2001, ref, paragraphs 26 to 33.

³ Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Meeting held on January 15, 2003, ref, paragraphs 13 to 27.

Port Radium Idle Mine Site

21. With respect to the Port Radium Idle Mine Site in the Northwest Territories, staff reported that, while it has received a written letter of intent to apply for a licence from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, additional time is needed to complete the required environmental assessment and CNSC licensing processes. Staff therefore recommended that the Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* (NSCA), extend the existing exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the site until December 31, 2007. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the extension of the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons; pose an unreasonable risk to national security; or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed.
22. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Port Radium Idle Mine Site until December 31, 2007 (see ANNEX B).

DECISIONGunnar Idle Mine Site

23. With respect to the Gunnar Idle Mine Sites in Saskatchewan, staff reported that the Province of Saskatchewan has done some work to reduce the human health risks at the site (e.g., fencing and signage).
24. Staff expressed concern about statements in a report recently issued by the Saskatchewan government⁴ indicating that the Province will not apply for a licence under the NSCA for the Gunnar site until such time as it has secured a commitment from the Government of Canada to provide what Saskatchewan considers to be an appropriate level of federal funding to complete the application, the decommissioning of the site and the required transition phase monitoring. The Government of Saskatchewan indicated in the same report that, in the interim, it will continue to monitor the Gunnar site to assess and address, as required, any identified public safety and/or environmental risks.

⁴ Report from Government of Saskatchewan, December 2003, *Gunnar & Lorado 2002-2003 Update*. Submitted under cover letter: A. Parkinson (Deputy Minister, Saskatchewan Northern Affairs) to K. Scissons (CNSC), dated January 28, 2004, CNSC # 1034765.

25. Staff expressed its concern about Saskatchewan's reluctance to apply for a licence and considers that a more proactive approach from Saskatchewan is warranted. Staff stated that the current exemption from licensing is due to expire on December 31, 2004 and that staff is prepared to take regulatory action as appropriate to bring the site under CNSC licence control in a timely manner. Staff noted that it will monitor the situation and provide a further update at the Commission meeting scheduled for June 2004.

ACTION

26. The Members indicated that the Commission shares staff's concern about the current lack of a licence application for the Gunnar site and reiterated the Commission's intent to bring the site under CNSC licensed control.

27. With respect to the current environmental risks caused by the Gunnar property, the Members sought information on the impacts on fish and the potential effects on human health from consuming the fish. In response, staff stated that sport fishing does occur on Lake Athabaska and that contaminants in the fish are monitored periodically by the provincial authorities. Staff reported that there are currently no indications of potential health effects caused by the Gunnar site and that the province has not issued warnings on the consumption of fish from the lake. Staff indicated its satisfaction that the local residents are being kept adequately informed of conditions and any potential health issues.

Lorado Idle Mine Site

28. With respect to the Lorado Mine site in Saskatchewan, staff reported that the Saskatchewan government has, in the same report referred to above for the Gunnar site⁴, expressed the view that the owner of the site is EnCana West Limited (EnCana) rather than the Province of Saskatchewan. Staff noted, however, that a significant portion of the tailings exist outside of EnCana's property and into Nero Lake. Accordingly, staff stated that it continues to encourage both parties to proceed with a licence application.

29. Staff stated that, as with the Gunnar site discussed above, it is concerned about Saskatchewan's decision to not proceed with an application for licensing the Lorado site and that staff is prepared to take appropriate regulatory action to bring the site under CNSC licensed control in a timely manner. Staff is of the view that the issues of site access control, radiological risks and increasing incremental environmental impacts must be addressed in a timely manner. Staff noted that, while these concerns about the site exist,

staff is of the view that the criteria set out in section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations* continue to be met. As such, staff stated that there is no need at this time to revoke or extend the current exemption which expires in December 2004.

30. The Members noted that they share the staff's concerns regarding the Lorado site and requested that staff keep the Commission informed of significant developments. Staff noted that it will provide a further status report on the Lorado mine site to the Commission at the December 8, 2004 meeting of the Commission, or sooner if required.

ACTION

Idle Uranium Mines Without Tailings

31. Staff summarized the findings of its assessments to date at idle uranium mines without tailings in Canada. Those sites are the subject of an exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances that expires on December 31, 2004.
32. Staff confirmed that it has recently received funding under the CNSC research and support program to continue with the assessment program.
33. Staff further reported that, since its first status report to the Commission in January 2003, four additional sites have been identified (one in Quebec and three in the Northwest Territories).
34. Staff stated that it will make recommendations to the Commission with respect to the CNSC's regulatory involvement at all of the identified sites at the scheduled Commission Meeting on December 8, 2004.
35. As a result of the additional sites having been identified, staff recommended that the Commission expand the current exemption to all such sites in Canada; the expiry date for the exemption would remain December 31, 2004.
36. After seeking the staff's views on an alternate, site-specific approach to considering the exemptions, the Commission decided to approve, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, an expansion of the existing exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at uranium sites without tailings, to include the four additional sites referred to by staff in section 2.7 of CMD 04-M6 (see ANNEX B).

ACTION

The Commission notes that if staff identifies additional sites during the course of its research, the Commission will consider applications for further expansions of the exemption on a case-by-case basis.

DECISION

Release of Low-risk Lands to the Provincial Crown

37. Staff reported that it has received a number of requests from licensees to amend their licences to allow the release of low-risk leased lands back to the provincial Crown. Staff stated that it is exploring the regulatory options in this regard and will be making recommendations to the Commission in the near future.

ACTION

Status Report on Waste Management Areas Owned by the Crown, Historic Contaminated Lands, Landfills and Devices Containing Radium Luminous Compounds

38. With reference to CMD 04-M7, CMD 04-M7.A and CMD 04-M7.B, staff provided the Commission with its second annual status report on the waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills, and devices containing radium luminous compounds for which the Commission granted exemptions in December 2001⁵.
39. Staff will continue to provide the Commission with annual reports on the status of exemptions for waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills, and devices containing radium luminous compounds.
40. The Chair noted that CMD 04-M7.A and CMD 04-M7.B contain privileged information and therefore the Commission would, if necessary, move in-camera to discuss that information.

ACTION

Passmore Interim Storage Mound; Fort McMurray Long-Term Management Facility; Fort Smith Interim Storage Mound; and Tulita Interim Storage Mound

41. With reference to CMD 04-M7.A, staff recommended that the Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the NSCA, extend the existing exemptions from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the locations identified as: Passmore Interim Storage Mound; Fort McMurray Long-Term Management Facility; Fort Smith Interim Storage Mound; and Tulita Interim Storage Mound until December 31, 2005. Referring

⁵ Minutes of the Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission held December 13 and 14, 2001, reference: paragraphs 34 – 42 and Annex C.

to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the extension of the exemptions would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons; pose an unreasonable risk to national security; or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also concluded that federal environmental assessments of the proposed exemptions are not required pursuant to the CEAA or the *Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act*.

42. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Passmore Interim Storage Mound; Fort McMurray Long-Term Management Facility; Fort Smith Interim Storage Mound; and Tulita Interim Storage Mound until December 31, 2005 (see ANNEX B).

DECISION

Lakeshore Road Consolidation Mound

43. With respect to the site identified as the Lakeshore Road Consolidation Mound, staff reported that the Greater Toronto Area Conservation Authority (GTACA), rather than the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Office (LLRWMO), has been identified as the entity responsible for the site. As a result, the LLRWMO has sought to withdraw its application for a CNSC licence at this location. Based on discussions with the GTACA, staff is satisfied that the GTACA will apply for the required licence. However, to allow time for the licensing process with the GTACA to be concluded, staff recommended that the Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the NSCA, extend the current exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Lakeshore Consolidation Mound (currently due to expire on June 30, 2004) to December 31, 2005. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the extension of the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons; pose an unreasonable risk to national security; or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also concluded that a federal environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required pursuant to the CEAA.

44. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Lakeshore Consolidation Mound until December 31, 2005.

DECISION

Deloro Mine Site

45. Further with respect to CMD 04-M7, staff summarized the status of the process that is underway and on schedule to bring the Deloro Mine Site in Ontario under CNSC licence, including the environmental assessment being conducted pursuant to the CEEA.
46. To allow time for the completion of that process, staff recommended that the Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the NSCA, extend the current exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Deloro Mine Site (currently due to expire on December 31, 2004) to December 31, 2007. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the extension of the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons; pose an unreasonable risk to national security; or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also concluded that a further federal environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required pursuant to the CEEA.
47. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Deloro Mine Site until December 31, 2007 (see ANNEX B).

DECISION

Mildly Contaminated Lands

48. Also with reference to CMD 04-M7, staff reported that it has completed assessments of 10 suspect sites located along the Great Bear River in the Northwest Territories. Staff reported that, as a result, 8 of the 10 sites have been removed from any requirements for long-term institutional control. The other 2 sites (ref. CMD 04-M7, Table 2) remain under institutional control.

Other Exemptions

49. With respect to the other exemptions addressed in CMD 04-M7, including the exemptions for the: Port Hope unlicensed sites; municipal landfill sites; and radium luminescent devices, staff provided updated information to the Commission, but did not recommend any change to the current exemptions at this time.
50. In response to a question from the Members on the Port Hope unlicensed sites, staff clarified the respective roles and responsibilities of the CNSC and Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN). Staff noted that the CNSC is one of three responsible federal authorities for the purpose of the EA being conducted pursuant to the CEAA and that NRCAN is acting as the lead Responsible Authority. Staff further noted that this relationship with the other federal authorities during the EA does not change in any way what would be the CNSC's authority under the NSCA should the sites proceed to licensing.

Establishment and Implementation of Training and Examination Programs for Certified Personnel

51. With reference to CMD 04-M8, staff provided a summary of, and basis for, the training and examination programs for certified personnel and the steps leading to the transfer of key aspects of the programs to the licensees.
52. Staff reported that, while there have been delays, significant progress has been made and the programs and regulatory documentation for the project is reaching maturity.
53. With respect to the supply of certified personnel at multi-unit stations, staff noted that the CNSC requires there be an Authorized Nuclear Operator (ANO) at, or directly supervising, all reactor unit control panels, and that OPG and Bruce Power had earlier committed to achieve this by early 2005. Staff reported that, despite that earlier commitment, OPG and Bruce Power have since reported that they will not be able to comply with this deadline. Staff added that this could have an impact on plant operation and the situation continues to be monitored closely.
54. In response to a question from the Members on this, staff confirmed that the shortage of ANOs is not an issue at the single-unit stations (i.e., Gentilly-2 NGS and Point Lepreau NGS) where an ANO is always in attendance at the control panel.

55. The Members sought clarification from the licensees in attendance at the meeting on why the training and certification of ANOs is delayed to such an extent. Bruce Power responded that this is in part due to the CNSC's mandatory requirement to have a systematic assessment of training for all positions before transfer of the examinations. Bruce Power also stated that, at Bruce A and B NGSs, Control Panel Operators (rather than ANOs), are used only about 4% of the time. Bruce Power expressed the view that this does not compromise safety. Bruce Power stated that it is committed to meeting the CNSC requirement and is taking all reasonable measures to do so as soon as possible. OPG added that, due to the CNSC's requirements for training, several ANOs are occupied with the conduct of the training and are engaged in other activities. OPG also pointed to a high attrition rate in the ANO population (particularly at Darlington NGS). OPG stated that although it has improved the training such that an ANO can be trained in half the time previously required, meeting the CNSC requirements for control room attendance by 2009 will be a challenge.
56. Staff added that it is satisfied with the licensees' level of understanding of the CNSC's concerns and requirements. Staff is also satisfied with the cooperation between the licensees and CNSC staff in attempting to achieve the desired outcome as quickly as possible. Staff noted that it will meet with the licensees on February 26, 2004 to discuss risk-informed alternatives to addressing the problem.
57. The Members acknowledged the need to continue to approach the problem of ANO shortages in a risk-based manner. However, the Members also expressed concern that, with the potential of additional units coming on line, the problem could conceivably worsen markedly in the near future. The Members urged the industry and staff to continue to attend seriously to this matter and to ensure that the targets and schedules discussed in the future are based on a complete consideration of all realistic and relevant factors. Staff is requested to report any significant safety issues regarding this matter to the Commission in a timely manner.

Renewal of Certifications

58. With reference to CMD 04-M9, staff provided the Members with a review and update on the introduction of a limit of five years on CNSC certifications for operations personnel at nuclear power plants. The update was requested by the Members at its meeting

held on January 15, 2003⁶.

59. Staff reported that all licensees have submitted their action plans and schedules for the implementation of requalification tests, as requested, and some licensees have started to conduct the tests. Staff continues to monitor the testing and competencies of the certified personnel.
60. In response to the Members' question on the level of union involvement in the process, staff responded that union representatives participated in the working group established to define the requirements for the examinations.

CNSC Regulatory Document Program

61. With reference to CMD 04-M10, staff provided a summary of the status of the regulatory document program, including a list of the documents published in 2003.

Closure of the Public Meeting

The public portion of the meeting closed at 5:29 p.m. and the Commission moved in-camera to deliberate on the decisions.

Chair

Recording Secretary

Secretary

⁶ Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Meeting held Wednesday, January 15, 2003, ref. paragraphs 41 to 45.

ANNEX A

CMD	DATE	File No
04-M1	2003-12-30	(1-3-1-5)
Notice of Meeting held on Wednesday, February 4, 2004 in Ottawa		
04-M2	2004-01-21	(1-3-1-5)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday and Thursday, February 4 and 5, 2004		
04-M2.A	2004-01-30	(1-3-1-5)
Revised Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday and Thursday, February 4 and 5, 2004		
04-M2.B	2004-02-03	(1-3-1-5)
Revised Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday and Thursday, February 4 and 5, 2004		
04-M3	2004-01-20	(1-3-1-5)
Approval of Minutes of Commission Meeting held November 26 and 27, 2003		
04-M4	2004-01-19	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report no. 2004-1		
04-M5	2004-01-20	(1-3-1-5)
Status Report on Power Reactors for the period of November 6, 2003 to January 19, 2004		
03-M68	2003-11-07	(26-0-0-0-0)
Criteria for Preparing Significant Development Reports [moved from Nov. 26-27, 2003 Meeting]		
04-M6	2004-01-20	(37-20-5-0, 37-30-13-0, 37-20-4-0, 37-25-0-0)
Status report on site conditions and progress of the licensing process for unlicensed uranium tailings management sites		
04-M6 .A	2004-01-30	(37-20-5-0, 37-30-13-0, 37-20-4-0, 37-25-0-0)
Status report on site conditions and progress of the licensing process for unlicensed uranium tailings management sites – Supplementary Information		

04-M7 2004-01-20 (37-16-8-0, 37-16-8-1, 37-16-8-2, 37-16-8-3, 37-16-8-4,
37-24-0-0, 37-0-0-0)

Status report on site conditions and progress on the licensing process of waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills and radium-luminescent devices.

04-M7.A 2004-01-28 (37-16-8-0, 37-16-8-1, 37-16-8-2, 37-16-8-3, 37-16-8-4,
37-24-0-0, 37-0-0-0)

Status report on site conditions and progress on the licensing process of waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills and radium-luminescent devices. – Supplementary Information

04-M7.B 2004-02-03 (37-16-8-0, 37-16-8-1, 37-16-8-2, 37-16-8-3, 37-16-8-4,
37-24-0-0, 37-0-0-0)

Status report on site conditions and progress on the licensing process of waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills and radium-luminescent devices. – Supplementary Information

04-M8 2004-01-20 (13-1-2-3-0)

Establishment and Implementation of Training and Examination Programs for Certified Personnel

04-M9 2004-01-20 (13-1-2-3-0)

Update on the introduction of a limit of five years on CNSC certifications for operations personnel at nuclear power plants

04-M10 2004-01-20 (1-8-8-0)

CNSC Regulatory Documents Program: Performance Report 2003

ANNEX B

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission February 4, 2004 – Meeting Decisions

Agenda item 6.1 **Unlicensed Uranium Tailings Management Sites**
reference: CMD 04-M6

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, extends the existing exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Port Radium Idle Mine Site until December 31, 2007.

Agenda item 6.1 **Idle Uranium Mines without Tailings**
reference: CMD 04-M6

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, expands the existing exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at uranium sites without tailings, to include the four additional sites referred to by CNSC staff in section 2.7 of CMD 04-M6.

Agenda item 6.2 **Waste Management Areas Owned by the Crown, Historic Contaminated Lands, Landfills and Devices Containing Radium Luminous Compounds**
reference: CMD 04-M7, CMD 04-M7.A and CMD 04-M7.B

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, extends the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the following sites until December 31, 2005:

- Passmore Interim Storage Mound;
- Fort McMurray Long-Term Management Facility;
- Fort Smith Interim Storage Mound;
- Lakeshore Road Consolidation Mound; and
- Tulita Interim Storage Mound.

Agenda item 6.2 **Waste Management Areas Owned by the Crown, Historic Contaminated Lands, Landfills and Devices Containing Radium Luminous Compounds**
reference: CMD 04-M7

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, extends the existing exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Deloro Mine Site until December 31, 2007.

Prior to making the above decisions, the Commission concluded that environmental assessments were not required pursuant to either the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* or the *Mackenzie Valley Resources Management Act*, as applicable.