DIS-17-01, Framework for Recovery in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

4.0 Proposed framework for recovery

The IAEA has established General Safety Requirements: Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards that pertain to the protection of the public from exposure to "contamination of areas by residual radioactive material arising from an emergency, after an emergency exposure situation has been declared ended." [14]

A number of other international documents describe key elements of the recovery phase that should be considered. Further, a number of countries have developed their own national guidance on this topic. Lessons learned have shaped international and national recommendations. The CNSC has benchmarked the progress in this area and has relied on it, where possible, to develop this discussion paper.

The remainder of this discussion paper will focus on providing information and guidance on the proposed recovery framework. It should be noted, however, that many elements may be considered and initiated by decision makers in the preparedness and response phases of the emergency.

It is important to recognize that there will be a period of time to allow for the transition from emergency response to recovery. This period will allow for actions to be effectively implemented to ensure timely resumption of social and economic activity.

4.1 Key recovery elements

The planned strategy for the recovery phase should include several considerations.

4.1.1 Stability of the situation

The situation should be examined to determine whether future progression of the emergency and any future releases are well understood and controlled. Recovery cannot take place until, at a minimum, the situation at the source has stabilized and there is no longer a need for precautionary or urgent protective actions.

4.1.2 Transition

Since an emergency evolves from response to recovery, the decision-making process may become more complex. It will require shifting roles and responsibilities and will likely require the involvement of additional organizations. As such, the following should be accomplished at the preparedness stage:

• roles and responsibilities for the recovery phase should be identified, to the extent practical
• a mechanism should be established for a formal transfer of responsibilities that will take place during the transition between the emergency phase and the recovery phase

The transition from the emergency phase (i.e., an emergency exposure situation) to the recovery phase (i.e., an existing exposure situation) is characterised by a change in management and a change in strategy. During the emergency phase, both are mainly driven by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure and predominantly central decisions. During the recovery phase, strategies are more decentralized, involve less urgency, and focus on improving living conditions and reducing exposures. In the case of severe accidents affecting large geographical areas, the transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase may occur at different times within the contaminated areas [14].

As an emergency evolves from response to recovery, the parts of the emergency-response organization that were active during the emergency should be gradually or partially relieved of their duties so that the organizations involved can return to a state of readiness for any future emergencies. This approach will allow other organizations to take over activities to facilitate recovery. As such, at the preparedness stage, arrangements should be made among the relevant response organizations for this transfer of responsibilities.

4.1.3 Protecting the public

• The protective actions that have been put in place during the emergency response must be reviewed to determine if adjustment or termination of these protective actions is required.
• The doses that were received by members of the public during the emergency response must be reviewed and any follow-up actions identified.
• The current exposure situation must be assessed through environmental monitoring and exposure pathways modelling (where appropriate), and prognosis of the future development of the exposure situation. Reassessment of the exposure situation should occur continuously throughout the recovery phase.
• Appropriate protective actions must be identified and implemented based on the results of the assessment of the exposure situation and comparison to the selected reference level.
• A reassessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the protective actions should be completed alongside the reassessments of the exposure assessment. Activities aimed at physically reducing radioactivity in the environment (e.g., decontamination, characterization and quantification of radioactive waste, and waste management) should be implemented.
• Doses received by recovery workers involved in implementing the protective actions and clean-up activities should be managed.

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this discussion paper address key elements of the recovery framework that focus on the protection of the public. Section 4.4 details protection measures for recovery workers. Section 5 details communication and engagement with the public.

4.1.4 Return to the new normal

There may be situations in which the decision is made to abandon contaminated areas altogether and resettle impacted individuals and communities to areas that were not affected by the emergency in a direct radiological sense. In this case, most of the activities described in the remainder of section 4 are not applicable. Notwithstanding, there is recognition that despite an absence of any radiological impacts, there are very likely to be psychological and social impacts associated with the re-settlement and the emergency itself that must be addressed. These decisions should be made involving extensive consultation with stakeholders.

4.2 Protecting the public during recovery

This section will describe the key actions and strategies for protecting the public during recovery in the event of an emergency.

4.2.1 Implementing recovery strategies

During the emergency, a number of protective actions may have been implemented with the goal of reducing potentially harmful exposures to radiation. Such actions could include ingestion of potassium iodide (KI), sheltering, evacuation and possibly relocation. As time progresses, any actions taken during the emergency should be examined to decide whether changes are warranted. This is likely to occur during the response phase, but also requires consideration during the recovery phase, depending on the timeframes involved. In some cases, actions such as evacuations will likely need to be terminated during the recovery period. Other actions, such as restrictions on locally sourced food, milk and drinking water, may be modified or adjusted. The extent of these adjustments will depend on the actions themselves (for example, evacuation and temporary housing measures are not sustainable in the long term), on the doses received to date, and the actions projected for continuing, terminating or altering the action. Various government nuclear emergency response plans provide guidance on lifting the protective actions implemented during the emergency phase [9,11,17].

During the recovery phase, new protective actions may need to be taken to maintain doses below the desired reference level. Even if doses are below the reference level, protective actions should not be discontinued if doses can be further lowered [18]. Many factors can impact the protection strategy, including: timing, resources, waste management options, as well as social and ethical aspects. The complexity of the situation may warrant the use of decision-making tools to aid in the development of the strategy.

In general, there are two types of protective actions that could be implemented during the recovery phase: those implemented or overseen by recovery management organizations, and self-help actions implemented by individuals. Those implemented by the recovery management organizations are generally those that cannot be implemented by individuals or those that are taken by the population as a whole to reduce exposures. Self-help actions implemented by individuals are those that are within the control of individuals to reduce their own personal exposures. These two types of protective actions are described in more detail in subsections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2.

4.2.1.1 Protective actions implemented by the recovery management organizations

The recovery management organizations are primarily responsible for characterizing the exposures of the affected population, including identifying the main exposure pathways, estimating doses, and identifying protective actions that could be applied to the affected population to optimize doses.

Typical protective actions that could be implemented by recovery management organizations include [18]:

• deciding whether people can live in contaminated areas
• cleaning up buildings
• remediating soil and vegetation
• issuing food controls and providing clean foodstuffs

Protective actions implemented by recovery management organizations may be institutional or engineered in nature. An example of an institutional action would be placing restrictions on ingestion of locally produced foodstuffs to avoid ingestion of radionuclides. An example of an engineered action would be adding a layer of pavement or cement over gamma-emitting radionuclides that are not removable from streets or sidewalks [19].

Recovery management organizations should identify and possibly delineate the borders of the contaminated area early on, and then reassess and adjust these borders throughout the recovery phase. This delineation will help enable the implementation of protective actions such as restrictions on foodstuffs and will assist with communicating with the local population [20]. The delineation of the contaminated area will need to strike a careful balance between placing too many constraints on the area, potentially resulting in unnecessary remediation and inappropriate labelling of the area as unsafe and not providing enough protection or not addressing the concerns of stakeholders [21].

4.2.1.2 Recommendations for self-help actions

Past experience has shown that direct involvement of individuals, communities and local professionals in the management of an emergency situation improves the recovery process by empowering those impacted. When recovery management organizations facilitate the processes by which inhabitants define and apply their own protection strategies, not only are exposures reduced but overall wellbeing also increases [18,20].

In general, examples of self-help protective actions that can be applied to understand and control the radiological situation include [18]:

• establishing local mapping and identifying areas of higher dose rates
• measuring the presence of contamination in foodstuffs that may be consumed and modifying dietary habits
• managing radioactive waste

4.2.2 Environmental and food chain monitoring

The environmental monitoring program should be informed by the radionuclides involved, the physical and chemical composition of the radioactive contamination, the medium containing the radionuclides, and practices relating to land and water use. The locations for measurement and sampling should be selected on a site-specific basis in such a way that the highest radiation doses can be assessed [23].

In the case of emergencies impacting the food supply, including foodstuffs in the monitoring program is particularly important. The monitoring program should be robust enough to ensure compliance with any restrictions put in place, including the existing criteria for restricting contaminated food in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear or radiological emergency. (For reference, see the intervention levels established in the Canadian guidelines for the restriction of radioactively contaminated food and water following a nuclear emergency [10] and in the emergency response plans for New Brunswick and Ontario.) Additional criteria should be established to manage long-term contamination of the food supply from long-lived radionuclides [21]. The criteria established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission may also need to be considered when monitoring food and food products for suitability for international trade [24].

4.2.3 Exposure pathways and dose assessments

Exposure pathways must be considered to conduct dose assessments that will influence the recovery process. The recovery phase of an emergency will likely entail different considerations than the response phase. For example, significant releases to the air from a nuclear power plant should no longer occur in the recovery phase, therefore exposure to radioactivity in a plume released to the atmosphere (i.e., cloudshine) is no longer a dominate exposure pathway. The remaining exposure pathways that may need to be considered in the recovery phase include, but are not limited to:

• external exposure from radioactivity deposited on the ground (i.e., groundshine)
• internal exposure from inhalation of re-suspended radionuclides
• internal exposure from ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs
• internal exposure from ingestion of contaminated drinking water

When considering exposure pathways, the pattern of deposition of radioactivity is likely to be complex and the resulting exposure to individuals could vary greatly. Exposure pathways will depend on circumstances such as the types of land use and the habits of the directly affected people and communities. As such, additional pathways will need to be considered where appropriate. For example, ingestion of soil by children might need to be considered with regard to land use restrictions for parkland.

When moving towards recovery, preliminary dose assessments should be performed focusing on the doses that could be received in the future (i.e., in the existing exposure situation). It is likely there will be a broad range of exposures. Therefore, as information becomes available, the dose assessment should become more specific regarding individual doses.

Due to the variability in exposures between individuals in the recovery phase, doses should be determined on an individual basis or by considering defined portions of the population. For long-lived radionuclides with slight dependence of the dose coefficients on age (e.g. tritium and caesium), adults consuming local foodstuffs will usually be the most exposed population group.

For radionuclides in which dose coefficients depend strongly on age because of their specific metabolic properties (e.g. strontium, radium and polonium), infants or children usually form the most exposed population group [23]. The dose assessment should take into account realistic habits, the known pattern and extent of deposition of radionuclides in the environment, and the foodstuffs consumed by the affected population. For instance, the population could be divided into groups based on geographic location or lifestyle habits to assist in tailoring the dose assessments. In some cases, direct individual dosimetry may be warranted or desired, and can be used for the dose assessment.

The following guidance for internal and external dose assessments should be considered.

The external dose to the population during the recovery phase may be determined on the basis of environmental monitoring data. Persons working mainly outdoors and those living in one-storey houses constructed of light materials such as wood may receive the highest external exposure. Personal interviews may be used to determine estimations of typical occupancy times for living, working and rest areas [23]. Dose-rate measurement at various occupied locations, both outdoors and indoors, can be used to assess the existing external doses. Alternatively, the levels of soil deposition of particular radionuclides in the area assessed can be used for estimation of the external doses due to radionuclides.

The environmental monitoring program data on radionuclide concentrations in environmental samples, drinking water and food products should be used for the assessment of the internal doses due to the inhalation or ingestion of radionuclides [23]. The internal doses during the recovery phase due to the ingestion of contaminated food and drinking water should be determined on the basis of environmental monitoring data and consumption rates. In regions where the inhabitants normally consume substantial amounts of natural food products (e.g., game, freshwater fish, forest mushrooms and berries), it is important to consider increased consumption rates. If environmental monitoring program data for food are unavailable or insufficient, the concentrations of radionuclides in foodstuffs can be roughly estimated from data on soil deposition or water concentrations by using known coefficients of radionuclide transfer from soil or water to plants and animals [23]. In areas that are significantly contaminated with radionuclides, or in areas with elevated rates of transfer of radionuclides from soil to biota, individual whole-body monitoring may be used to determine the human body burden and to assess doses due to the internal exposure. The results of individual measurements should be used mainly for validation of the models applied for the purposes of internal dose assessment [23].

To determine annual doses, all the components of the external and internal exposure caused by the environmental radiation, including natural background radiation, should be accounted for. During the recovery stage, there is usually no danger of tissue reactions among the population, and therefore methods of dose assessment based on best parameter estimates should be employed, rather than conservative models as used in emergencies. The doses should therefore be estimated on the basis of realistic, dosimetric models.

Special programs of monitoring may be undertaken for the validation of models and the provision of information for public reassurance [23]. The most reliable method of validation of an ingestion model is by comparing its predictions with internal dose assessments made on the basis of data from individual measurements of radionuclide contents in the human body performed by whole-body counting or by analyzing the concentrations of radionuclides in excreta [23].

Results from the dose assessments should be used as a factor to inform, initially, on the choice of the value within the 1–20 mSv reference level. Further, it should be used as a factor in evaluating the different options for implementing the recovery strategies that were discussed previously and on evaluating the success of the strategies. The process of dose assessment and recovery strategy evaluation should be iterative.

4.2.4 Health monitoring

Following an emergency, the exposed population should have received some information regarding their levels of exposure (associated with the emergency exposure situation) and the potential associated health risks. However, during or prior to recovery, a health monitoring program should be established along with the logistic, scientific and administrative resources needed for implementation [20].

This health monitoring program should focus on:

• following up with individuals who may have received doses that resulted in, or could result in, significant deterministic effects (e.g., skin burns, cataracts) to provide appropriate medical attention
• screening the affected populations that might be at an increased risk of developing cancer so as to provide for early detection and diagnosis
• developing a registry of those individuals identified as requiring longer-term health monitoring (this should be established prior to, or early in the recovery process)
• offering psychological and psychosocial support for the affected individuals and populations

It is expected that doses received during recovery (i.e., the existing exposure situation) are expected to be low enough that medical follow up would not be warranted. The doses referred to above are those that were incurred mainly from the emergency exposure situation.

4.2.5 Managing contamination

Managing the contaminated environment can be carried out in many ways and will depend on the prevailing conditions after the emergency. In general, effective management of the contamination will be considered clean-up after the emergency, or specifically decontamination to either reduce or remove the potentially hazardous materials or substances. However, it must also be recognized that decontamination is only part of the overall contamination management strategy. This strategy could also include other types of activities, such as imposing different land or commodity uses, and restricting their use and export to other areas.

The management of contaminated areas, including decontamination and the management of waste, should begin as early as possible in the recovery phase (or the time leading up to recovery) and should be used to delineate the contaminated areas. The objectives of these activities are to allow any evacuated or relocated populations to return to their homes as soon as possible, to allow anyone living in the area to resume living as normally as possible [19], and to allow for resumption of economic and social activities.

4.2.5.1 Decontamination

Decontamination is the physical removal of contamination in the environment. Once the radiological situation is well understood, the areas to be decontaminated should be prioritized according to those that will be most effective in reducing individual exposures. This is done by considering potential exposure pathways, current or future land-use and dietary habits [19,20].

Decontamination goals and criteria should be identified and set in terms of measurable quantities and will need to be established based on an understanding of the:

• reference level chosen
• predicted effectiveness of potential decontamination actions
• area impacted (i.e., size, characteristics, location relative to the population)
• predicted utilization for the area
• site-specific background levels of radioactivity (if known)
• impacts of the contamination and potential decontamination actions on human health and the environment [19, 25]

The method employed to decontaminate the environment will need to be selected in consideration of many of the same factors, including the:

• effectiveness of the action to protect human health and the environment over time
• performance and costs of different technologies
• effectiveness of the decontamination action as the cleanup progresses
• time it takes to carry out
• impacts on the local and regional economy
• weather conditions and time of year
• types of surfaces to be cleaned [19, 25]

Setting decontamination goals and undertaking decontamination strategies should be an iterative process. Decontamination goals should be adjusted as experience is gained [19]. If, for example, radioactive material cannot be physically removed from the environment, it may be appropriate to choose alternate options such as fixing it in place or covering it. This will, at a minimum, prevent re-suspension, remove the potential for inhalation exposures, and may help limit external exposures [25].

4.2.5.2 Waste management

Activities carried out in the recovery phase, particularly decontamination of the environment, may result in a large amount of waste from varying sources and of different types. Some of the waste may contain high levels of radioactivity, especially if produced close to the emergency’s origin. Most of the waste is expected to be only slightly contaminated, although potentially in large quantities [19].

Early in the recovery phase, if appropriate, waste management may simply consist of storing waste away from the contaminated area. Criteria will need to be established such that, once the resources become available, the waste can be sorted by the amount of radioactive material and the types of waste (e.g., solid, liquid or organic) based on an appropriate hazard assessment [20, 25].

It may be possible to process the waste to reduce its quantity or convert it into a more suitable form for disposal. Some processes that could be considered for waste reduction include: incinerating, filtering, distilling or solidifying liquids, and chemically treating liquids [26].

As part of the waste-management efforts, a variety of disposal options may need to be considered. In general, methods for waste disposal are based on the principles of isolation and containment [27]. Isolation is placing the waste in a location remote from where individuals and communities live and is typically appropriate for waste contaminated with long-lived radionuclides that cannot be removed. Containment includes those activities or structures that are designed to prevent the release of radioactive waste to the environment. It also protects the physical environment from the waste. Dilution is generally not considered acceptable since it increases the volume of radioactive waste without reducing the inventory.

If the waste volumes are relatively small, existing radioactive waste-management facilities may have sufficient capacity to manage the waste. However, if a large amount of material is involved (which is likely the case in a situation involving a more significant release), the capacity at these facilities may be exceeded. In this case, other hazardous waste or conventional landfill facilities may need to be considered. New facilities could be constructed at the site where the radionuclide release originated, elsewhere within the contaminated area, or away from the affected area altogether [19]. If the waste is to be relocated elsewhere, transportation of radioactive material should be considered. All waste sites must have appropriate controls to protect public health and the environment from any level of radioactive contamination. Highly radioactive materials will need more robust controls than slightly contaminated materials [19]. If waste contains fissile materials, the potential for criticality would have to be managed.

4.3 Protecting recovery workers

Doses received by persons involved in the control of an emergency are treated separately from those received from planned occupational exposures, which include recovery efforts. Similarly, a distinction should be made with respect to radiation exposures received by workers during recovery efforts as a consequence of their occupation and those received as a result of exposures due to environmental conditions resulting from the emergency.

During the recovery phase, activities should be carefully planned, and exposures to workers controlled according to applicable dose limits for non-emergency situations. The dose limits prescribed in sections 13 and 14 of the RPR [4] would apply during recovery and the application of the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle would be expected. Doses received by workers due to their residency, work location and consumption of foodstuffs within an affected area, post-emergency would not be considered in the context of the occupational dose limits prescribed by the regulations.

It is important to note that, post-emergency, there will be potentially two sets of occupationally exposed workers: people who work at a licensed facility in the affected area during the recovery phase and workers who are specifically tasked to conduct recovery actions under the direction of the recovery management organization. The protection of workers at the licensed facility would be governed by the licensee’s protection programs including both conventional and radiological safety.

The protection of workers involved in implementing recovery strategies under the direction of the recovery management organization would be managed through the implementation of similar protection programs with an all-hazards approach that is commensurate with the risks. It is expected that occupational exposures to radiation for this group of workers will be planned, monitored and optimized in a manner that will ensure that radiation exposures remain below limits and ALARA. As part of the safety programs, the recovery management organization would provide information, training, protective equipment and dosimetry to workers.

5.0 Public communication considerations during recovery

Throughout the recovery phase, increased levels of communication must be maintained to address the uncertainties and new normal. A central communications strategy should be developed and followed by all stakeholders to ensure clear direction and consistent messaging. It is important that there be no contradiction or confusion among members of the public.

The public and other stakeholders need to be informed on a regular basis. They will need to understand which agency or group of agencies are in charge so they know which instructions to follow. Most individuals will be concerned about the potential health consequences and the effects of the emergency on the environment.

As with all risk communications, it is important to communicate with the public using terminology that is universally understood. Consistent and coordinated messages need to come from credible sources, be clear and simple, supported with facts, and given with the appropriate context to explain the information more clearly to the recipient audience.

For affected populations, one effective method of communication is to set up public reception and information centres to collect data and provide support and information. These types of centres provide the public the opportunity to share their personal experiences and receive direct responses to their questions [20]. It is also important to use regular communication to raise awareness about radiation protection measures within the community through the involvement of credible leaders such as teachers, scientific professionals, association members, and healthcare professionals [20].

6.0 Stakeholder feedback on the proposed regulatory approach

The CNSC actively encourages the nuclear industry, federal, provincial and municipal governments, other stakeholders and the public to provide their views on the proposed regulatory approach with regard to the Framework for Recovery in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency.

Specifically, the CNSC is seeking feedback on the appropriateness of the assumptions made regarding recovery, and the appropriateness of the assumptions made regarding roles and responsibilities during recovery in the text as well as in appendix A.

7.0 How to participate

Please submit your comments or feedback to:

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
P.O. Box 1046, Station B
280 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5S9
Fax: 613-995-5086
Email: consultation@cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca

Please indicate clearly which discussion paper you are commenting on. If you are responding to a specific question within the discussion paper, please also make reference to the question number.

Acronyms

ALARA

as low as reasonably achievable

CNSC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

ESF

emergency support functions

FERP

Federal Emergency Response Plan

FNEP

Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan

HC

Health Canada

KI

potassium iodide

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiological Protection

IEMP

Independent Environmental Monitoring Program

mSv

millisievert

NEM

nuclear emergency management

PEOC

Provincial Emergency Operations Centre

Glossary

absorbed dose

The quotient, in gray, obtained by dividing the energy absorbed through exposure to radiation by the mass of the body or part of the body that absorbs the radiation

countermeasure

An intervention or protective action taken to counter a danger or threat. Examples include evacuation and sheltering.

dose

A general term used to refer to the amount of energy absorbed by tissue from ionizing radiation. See also absorbed dose, equivalent dose and effective dose.

dose limit

A maximum allowable radiation dose (effective dose or equivalent dose), as specified in the Radiation Protection Regulations, which is in place to minimize the risk of adverse health effects due to radiation exposure.

effective dose

The sum of the products, in sievert, obtained by multiplying the equivalent dose of radiation received by and committed to each organ or tissue set out in column 1 of an item of Schedule 1 by the weighting factor set out in column 2 of that item.

equivalent dose

The product, in sievert, obtained by multiplying the absorbed dose of radiation of the type set out in column 1 of an item of Schedule 2 by the weighting factor set out in column 2 of that item.

emergency exposure situation

Situations that may occur during the operation of a planned situation, from a malicious act or from any other unexpected situation and which require urgent action to avoid or reduce undesirable consequences.

existing exposure situation

Situations that already exist when a decision on control has to be taken, including prolonged exposure situations after emergencies.

intervention

Any action of provision beyond normal procedures undertaken to manage the emergency and mitigate its impacts, including all emergency organization structures, response actions, communications, and public information and directives.

nuclear emergency

An event that has led, or could lead, to the release of radioactive material, or exposures to uncontrolled sources of radiation, which pose or could pose a threat to public health and safety, property or the environment.

optimization

The process of determining a level of protection and safety that makes exposures and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures as low as reasonably achievable, with economic and social factors being taken into account.

projected dose

The prediction of a dose that a population or individual could receive.

protective action

An action, countermeasure or intervention which reduces the radiation exposure of workers or members of the public.

radiological emergency

An emergency in which there is, or is perceived to be, a hazard due to radiation exposure or the energy resulting from a nuclear chain reaction or from the decay of the products of a chain reaction.

recovery

The period during which activities focus on restoration of quality of life, social systems, economies, community infrastructures, and the environment. Recovery may begin during the response phase and continue for up to several years after the emergency.

reference levels

The level of dose or risk above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and below which optimization of protection should be implemented.

remediation

Any measures that may be carried out to reduce the radiation exposure due to existing contamination of land areas through actions applied to the contamination itself (i.e., the source) or to the exposure pathways to humans. Complete removal of contamination is not implied.

sievert

The International System of Units (SI) unit of equivalent dose and effective dose, equal to 1 joule/kilogram.

References

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2. Public Safety Canada, Emergency Management Act (S.C. 2007, c. 15)
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8. Health Canada, Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (Fifth Edition), January 2014
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23. International Atomic Energy Agency, Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection, 2005
24. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Foods, Schedule 1 – Radionuclides, 2010
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26. Canadian Standards Association Group, CSA N292.3-14, Management of low- and intermediate level radioactive waste, 2014.
27. International Atomic Energy Agency, Specific Safety Requirements SSR-5, Disposal of Radioactive Waste, 2011

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