Country Review Report for Canada by Country Group 4

Glossary

The Glossary provides here the definitions of “Challenges”, “Suggestion” and “Good Practice” according to Annex IV of INFCIRC/571/Rev.7. The definition of “Area of Good Performance” was agreed upon by the Officers during the CNS Officers’ Meeting on 24-25 September 2019 and confirmed by the Officers at the CNS Officers’ Meeting on 18-19 July 2022.

A Challenge is “a difficult issue for the Contracting Party and may be a demanding undertaking (beyond the day-to-day activities); or a weakness that needs to be remediated.”

A Suggestion is “an area for improvement. It is an action needed to improve the implementation of the obligations of the CNS.”

A Good Practice is “a new or revised practice, policy or programme that makes a significant contribution to nuclear safety. A Good Practice is one that has been tried and proven by at least one Contracting Party but has not been widely implemented by other Contracting Parties; and is applicable to other Contracting Parties with similar programmes.”

An Area of Good Performance is “a practice, policy or programme that is worthwhile to commend and has been undertaken and implemented effectively. An Area of Good Performance is a significant accomplishment for the particular CP although it may have been implemented by other CPs.”

Executive Summary

In Canada, there are 19 operating nuclear power reactors and three reactors in safe storage state; all are of the CANDU design and are spread across five sites. There are four sites – Bruce, Darlington, Pickering and Point Lepreau - that have a licence from the Canadian independent nuclear regulator (CNSC) to operate. During the reporting period Hydro-Québec completed the transition to safe storage of the single reactor unit at the fifth site - Gentilly-2 - and will be proceeding to decommissioning the NPP in accordance with a CNSC licence to decommission. At the same time, long-term operation is being pursued or considered for many of the reactor units at the operating Canadian NPPs and abroad. Several existing NPPs have already undergone major life-extension projects. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act and the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act are the centrepieces of Canada’s legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear matters.

The Government of Canada has established a comprehensive and robust regulatory regime implemented by CNSC. The CNSC has de facto independence from licensees as well as from the government.

During the reporting period, Canadian interests have been involved in various efforts to develop and design SMRs. New build development activities are in progress in Canada.

2 out of 2 Challenges from the 6^th Review Meeting; 3 out of 3 Challenges and 1 out of 1 Suggestion from the 7^th Review Meeting have been closed.

The Country Group highlights the following measures during the reporting period to improve safety in Canada’s national nuclear programme:

• During the reporting period, the CNSC continued its progress in enhancing the regulatory framework – which included various regulatory documents relevant to existing NPPs and newbuild projects, including emerging small modular reactor (SMR) technologies – and aligning the regulatory framework with international standards (as a minimum). Renewals of operating licences for NPPs were used to introduce new standards and requirements, with provisions for implementation of the new requirements over predefined time periods.
• During the reporting period, the practice of conducting periodic safety reviews (PSRs) on 10- year intervals, as a means of assessing and closing gaps with modern requirements, was also formalized for all operating NPPs.
• In addition to the yearly funding the Government of Canada has agreed to provide nearly $100 million in direct investment to the nuclear industry, starting in 2020, through the Strategic Innovation Fund and Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency.
• Canada has also promoted the goal of international harmonization with respect to licensing SMRs. CNSC has established numerous memoranda of understanding with other nuclear regulatory bodies.
• CNSC has established processes for the licensing of SMR projects that utilize a graded approach.
• Various new-build developments were launched, such as the Darlington New Nuclear Project and the SMR Development at Chalk River.
• During the reporting period, there were two long-term operation programmes namely the Bruce A and B refurbishment, Darlington refurbishment (Unit 2 and commencement of Unit 3). Pickering extended operation. Further, there was a transition to decommissioning of Gentilly- 2.
• Replacement of major components (fuel channels, feeder piping and steam generators) in Bruce Unit 6
• Installation of a passive containment filtered venting system at Bruce A and Bruce B
• Diesel fire pump replacements, as well as installation of a portable heating, ventilation, air conditioning and filtration system for the secondary control area at Point Lepreau
• Periodic safety reviews (PSR) update for Pickering’s extended operation and integrated implementation plan (IIP)
• Completion of PSR for Bruce A and B and asset management
• Ongoing improvements to deterministic safety analysis
• Completion of full-scope probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) at all operating NPPs and methodology development for whole-site PSA
• Multiple safety culture self-assessments and other safety culture activities were conducted and implemented by the licensees of the operating NPPs

Detailed lists of modifications at Darlington, Pickering, Bruce A and B and Point Lepreau to respond to and mitigate beyond-design-basis accidents and severe accidents were provided in the National Report.

The Country Group highlights the following results of international peer review missions of Canada:

• In June 2019, the Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission to Canada took place. The CNSC, along with other federal, provincial and municipal emergency preparedness and response stakeholders, as well as the licensees of operating NPPs, participated in the mission. An EPREV Follow-up Mission is scheduled for 2023.
• Canada hosted an IRRS Mission in September 2019. Previous IRRS Missions were held in 2011 (IRRS Follow up) and 2009.
• Operational Safety review Team (OSART) was performed at Pickering in 2016 where three good practices were identified. A follow up mission was conducted in 2018. Follow-up Missions were also conducted at Bruce B in 2017 and Pickering in 2018.
• Six WANO peer reviews were conducted during the 9^th reporting period at Bruce A and B, Bruce A, Bruce B, Darlington, Pickering and Point Lepreau.

The Country Group identified the following Challenges for Canada:

• Challenge 1: Update guidance document Generic Criteria and Operational Intervention Levels for Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response and include guidance on protection strategies and reflect guidance in provincial plans
• Challenge 2: Approve and implement revision of Ontario’s Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan
• Challenge 3: Optimize regulatory capacity and capability to effectively and efficiently assess licence applications for other nuclear technologies
• Challenge 4: Ensure an effective approach between federal departments to provide proponents with certainty related to process and timelines for environmental/impact assessments

In addition, the Country Group identified no Suggestions, 7 Area of Good Performance and 2 Good Practices.

The Country Group concluded that Canada:

• Submitted National Reports for the 8^th CNS Review Meeting and for the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting, and therefore complied with Article 5; the reports were submitted in time, therefore following Rule 39 of INFCIRC/573/Rev.6.
• Attended the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting, and therefore complied with Article 24.1.
• Held a national presentation and answered questions during the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting, and therefore complied with Article 20.3.

1. Basic Information on Canada’s Nuclear Programme

In Canada, all reactor facilities are designated as Class 1A facilities and regulated under the Class 1 Nuclear Facilities Regulations. The nuclear installations referred to in the articles of the Convention are taken to specifically mean NPPs, which are a subset of Class 1A facility. The term ‘NPP’ is generally understood to mean any power producing reactor that is not a research reactor. For the purposes of the Canadian report, the term ‘NPP’ encompasses the existing operating fleet of CANDU reactors as well as any possible future, power-producing reactor facilities, such as small modular reactors (SMRs) or other advanced reactor concepts. The Canadian report does not cover nuclear research reactors. Under Canada’s constitution, the development and implementation of nuclear energy policy fall within the federal government’s jurisdiction. The Government of Canada’s role encompasses research and development (R&D), as well as the regulation of all nuclear materials and activities in Canada. Canada’s nuclear policy framework includes the following general elements: a nuclear non-proliferation policy, transparent and independent regulation, a radioactive waste policy framework, a uranium ownership and control policy, support for nuclear science and technology, and cooperation with provincial governments and municipal jurisdictions. The Government of Canada has funded nuclear research and supported the development and use of nuclear energy and related applications for many decades.

The Government of Canada has established a comprehensive and robust regulatory regime implemented by Canada’s independent nuclear regulator (CNSC). The CNSC consists of a President, the federally- appointed members of the Commission and over 900 staff members, as of the end of the reporting period. The CNSC has de facto independence from licensees as well as from the government, but also takes additional steps to ensure it takes independent, well-informed actions and decisions. The CNSC is an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal and court of record. The CNSC makes all licensing decisions and regulations. The technical support branch forms an integral part of the CNSC and the CNSC also provides in-house legal services. The Commission’s decisions are reviewable only by the Federal Court of Canada. The CNSC is financed by the Government of Canada through Parliamentary and statutory authorities.

The Independent Environmental Monitoring Program (IEMP) complements CNS regulatory oversight by complementing monitoring programs of other government agencies, such as Health Canada’s Canadian Radiation Monitoring Network, as well as provincial and licensee monitoring programs and it complements and confirms licensees’ environmental programs

Other Government Organizations involved in NPP Safety are: Health Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Provincial emergency authorities and Natural Resources Canada – the latter administers the Nuclear Energy Act, Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act and Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, establishes policies, priorities and programs for energy science and technology. For instance, Natural Resources Canada led development of Action Plan for SMRs to coordinate the work by diverse set of stakeholders.

The NSCA, the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act and the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act are the centrepieces of Canada’s legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear matters.

Out of the 22 nuclear power reactors, 19 are currently producing power and 3 reactors are in safe storage state in Canada. However, at various points during the 9^th reporting period, Units 2 and 3 at Darlington, and Unit 6 at Bruce, were shut down for refurbishment activities. In addition, Units 2 and 3 at Pickering and the one unit at Gentilly-2 are in a safe storage state. The Gentilly-2 unit has started the process toward decommissioning. The NPPs in Canada use pressurized heavy-water reactors of the CANDU design and are spread across five sites. There are four sites – Bruce, Darlington, Pickering and Point Lepreau - that have a CNSC licence to operate.

The Canadian NPPs are operated by 4 licensees: Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG), a commercial company wholly owned by the province of Ontario; Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power), a private corporation; Hydro-Québec, a Crown corporation of the province of Quebec; NB Power, a Crown corporation of the province of New Brunswick. The NPPs in Canada use pressurized heavy water reactors of the CANDU design. Candu Energy acts as the original designer and vendor of the CANDU technology in Canada.

The following summarizes major operational developments at the NPPs during the reporting period.

• Gentilly-2 is shut down and has a CNSC licence to decommission. Hydro-Québec completed the transition to safe storage during the reporting period and will be proceeding to decommissioning the NPP.
• Ontario Power Generation (OPG) began in 2016 refurbishing the four reactors at Darlington, starting with Unit 2. It was returned to service in 2020. Refurbishment activity began at Unit 3 began in 2020 and at Unit 1 in 2022.
• At the end of the reporting period, OPG intended to cease commercial operation of Pickering Units 2 and 3 by December 2024 and Pickering Units 5-8 by December 2025 (supported by a reassessment of the PSR to support safe operation for an additional year). Since that time OPG is studying feasibility of long-term operation of Pickering Units 5-8.
• Bruce Power plans to refurbish six of the eight reactors at the Bruce site, which entails conducting major component outages over a period of 13 years. Refurbishment of Unit 6 commenced in 2020. Bruce Power commenced the refurbishment of Unit 3 in 2023.

All CANDU operators in the world (including licensees of operating Canadian NPPs) and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) are members of the Candu Owners Group (COG): a not-for-profit organization that provides programmes for cooperation, mutual assistance and exchange of information for the successful support, development, operation, maintenance and economics of CANDU technology.

During the reporting period, Canadian interests have been involved in various efforts to develop and design SMRs. Following from the SMR Roadmap, Canada’s SMR Action Plan was launched on December 18, 2020. In March 2022, four Canadian provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and New Brunswick) released a joint provincial strategic plan aimed at expanding the use of nuclear power using SMRs.

NB Power and SaskPower selected in fact SMR technologies: NB Power has selected the site in New Brunswick and SaskPower is exploring two site options in Saskatchewan.

The Government of Canada granted $121M to support regulatory readiness and research related to SMRs (Includes $30M to help develop SMR supply chain and fund research on SMR waste management). There is potential for large new-build (Exploratory discussion ongoing for possible large new-build in Ontario). The CNSC published/revised three CNSC REGDOCs (including Version 2 of REGDOC-1.1.2, License Application Guide: Guide to Construct a Reactor Facility in Oct 2022).

The following new build development activities are in progress in Canada:

• OPG holds a licence to prepare a site for future construction of an NPP within the existing Darlington Site: OPG intended to submit an application in 2022 for a licence to construct. OPG submitted the application for licence to construct an SMR at Darlington in October 2022.
• Global First Power’s application for an SMR project at Chalk River Laboratories is currently undergoing regulatory review and an environmental assessment. The project is expected in commence operation in 2026, following receipt of all required CNSC licences.

Other notable achievements for Canada are as follows:

Measures to enhance regulatory safety culture; Increased participant funding to further facilitate stakeholder engagement in Commission proceedings; Annual, comprehensive regulatory oversight reports, presented in public forum, that summarize safety performance at nuclear facilities; Updates to analyses in safety reports for existing NPPs based on modern requirements, including CNSC REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis; Effective aging management programs for existing NPPs based on clear requirements using guidelines informed by research and diverse and innovative technologies.

2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis; Effective aging management programs for existing NPPs based on clear requirements using guidelines informed by research and diverse and innovative technologies.

2. Follow-Up from Previous CNS Review Meeting

2.1 Challenges

Canada provided the following updates on remaining Challenges identified during the 6^thCNS Review Meeting:

• Challenge 3: Establish guidelines for the return of evacuees’ post-accident and to confirm public acceptability of it

During the previous reporting period the CNSC was involved in a number of recovery phase initiatives, including participation in the IAEA’s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments Programme. The CNSC requested public review of draft REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, Volume II, which discussed and provided examples of best practices on preparedness for recovery. The Government of Canada drafted the “Framework for Recovery following a Nuclear Emergency”. The document was based on the former REGDOC-2.10.1, Volume II and considered all aspects required to recover from a nuclear emergency. The document was being finalized to address the results of the public consultation process and was planned to be published by fall 2020. Recovery measures were also tested during an emergency exercise, Synergy Challenge 2018 at Point Lepreau, which included a full day in testing the implementation of early recovery actions.

As addressed in the 9^th National Report, in December 2020 Health Canada published Guidance on Planning for Recovery Following a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, which provides direction on establishing public acceptability of any measures taken during the recovery phase of an actual nuclear emergency, including the return of evacuees. The organizations managing the recovery phase will engage the affected communities to develop appropriate strategies that encompass revitalization, support and compensation.

Canada considers the planned activities to address this challenge to be complete. Canada recommends that this Challenge be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

• Challenge 5: Update emergency operational interventional guidelines and protective measures for the public during and following major and radiological events

During the reporting period, Health Canada published the updated Generic Criteria and Operational Intervention Levels for Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response. The primary purpose of this document was to provide updated guidelines for public protective measures (including exposure control, ingestion control, population monitoring and medical management as well as off-site emergency workers) and align them with the latest recommendations from the IAEA and International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

Canada considers the planned activities to address this challenge to be complete. Canada recommends that this challenge be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

Canada provided the following updates on Challenges identified during the 7^thCNS Review Meeting

• Challenge 1: Publish the drafted amendments to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Radiation Protection Regulations that address lessons learned from Fukushima

In 2017, amendments to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Radiation Protection regulations to address lessons learned from Fukushima accident came into force. The amendments to the Radiation Protection Regulations involved an alignment with international guidance on overall preparedness for, and response to, radiological emergencies. The amendments also established requirements related to radiological hazards for emergency workers. Other changes to the Radiation Protection Regulations were made in 2020.

preparedness for, and response to, radiological emergencies. The amendments also established requirements related to radiological hazards for emergency workers. Other changes to the Radiation Protection Regulations were made in 2020.

Canada considers the planned activities to address this challenge to be complete. Canada recommends that this Challenge be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

• Challenge 2: Complete the transition to the improved regulatory framework (CNSC regulatory documents)

During the previous reporting period, the CNSC continued its progress in enhancing the regulatory framework – which included various regulatory documents relevant to existing NPPs and newbuild projects, including emerging small modular reactor (SMR) technologies – and aligning also the existing regulatory framework with international standards. As noted in the 9^th Report, the transition to the improved regulatory framework is complete, and the CNSC has a robust process for ongoing review, revision and development of regulatory documents. During the 9^th reporting period 31 REGDOC’s were either published or revised.

Canada considers the planned activities to address this challenge to be complete. Canada recommends that this Challenge be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

• Challenge 3: Formalize the planned approach to end-of-operation of multiunit NPPs

The CNSC developed a regulatory process for transition of an NPP from operation to decommissioning end state, G-219 Decommissioning Planning for Licensed Activities, which will be updated with lessons learned from NPPs that are approaching end of life and decommissioning, with a focus on multi-unit NPPs. REGDOC-2.11.2, Decommissioning, which was published in January 2021 formalises the planned approach to end-of-operation of multi-unit NPPs and detailed decommissioning plans.

As added in the 9^th National Report, the CNSC requires the licensee to develop a plan for the facility’s end of operation that entails a smooth transition from shutdown to a stable state. The CNSC is applying this approach for Pickering –the only multi-unit NPP in Canada currently approaching the end of commercial operation and documenting it in Pickering’s licence conditions handbook.

Canada considers the planned activities to address this challenge to be complete. Canada recommends that this Challenge be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

2.2 Suggestions

Canada provided the following updates on Suggestions identified during the 7^th CNS Review Meeting:

• Suggestion 1: Canada should address any CANDU safety issues that are Category 3 referenced in the 7^th national report and provide a report to the 8^th Review Meeting.

During the 9^th reporting period the remaining Category 3 CSIs were separated into two groups. CNSC accepted Bruce Power’s request to recategorize the three CSIs remaining at Category 3 that are relevant to large-break loss of coolant accidents (LBLOCAs); the other licensees are following up accordingly. In addition, the licensees are also developing a composite analytical approach to address the LBLOCA CSIs.

The non-LBLOCA CSIs have also been re-categorized with one exception. The CSI related to high energy line breaks remained at Category 3 only for Pickering Units 1 and 4, which had received a conditional re-recategorization while CNSC monitors the results of enhanced inspections of the affected lines.

Thus, the few remaining Category 3 CSIs were nearing recategorization for all NPPs. Since Canada is effectively addressing the few remaining CSIs to support their re-categorization from Category 3, and since Canada regularly reports on CSIs in its CNS reports. Canada recommends this Suggestion be closed.

effectively addressing the few remaining CSIs to support their re-categorization from Category 3, and since Canada regularly reports on CSIs in its CNS reports. Canada recommends this Suggestion be closed.

Follow Up Status: Closed

3. Measures to Improve Safety

3.1 Changes to the Regulatory Framework and the National Nuclear Programme

The NSCA, the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act and the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act are the centrepieces of Canada’s legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear matters.

Since the last Review Meeting, the Country Group took note of the following changes to the regulatory framework and the national nuclear programme:

Regulatory Framework improvements

• During the reporting period, the CNSC continued its progress in enhancing the regulatory framework – which included various regulatory documents relevant to existing NPPs and newbuild projects, including emerging small modular reactor (SMR) technologies – and aligning the regulatory framework with international standards (as a minimum). The licenses have been improved for operating power reactor and have the following characteristics: standardized licence conditions for all power reactors, license conditions handbooks for each NPP licensee that provide detailed criteria as well as guidance are aligned with the licensing basis of the facility. Renewals of operating licences for NPPs were used to introduce new standards and requirements, with provisions for implementation of the new requirements over predefined time periods. During the reporting period, the practice of conducting periodic safety reviews (PSRs) on 10-year intervals, as a means of assessing and closing gaps with modern requirements, was also formalized for all operating NPPs.
• The CNSC revised the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Radiation Protection Regulations. With the publication in 2015 of CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, (Periodic Safety Reviews), and its implementation to the licensing basis of Canadian NPPs, licensees now perform periodic safety reviews (PSRs) for licence renewals. The CNSC published a number of new regulatory documents that further clarify requirements for new NPP projects. To the extent practicable, consideration was given, in the development of these documents, to application of the requirements and guidance to various types and sizes of projects including SMR projects.
• CNSC is also enhancing licence application guidance for the licence to construct and is developing supplementary guidance for the licence application guides that can be applied to SMR projects through CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-1.1.5, Supplemental Information for Small Modular Reactor Proponents.
• Further, the CNSC has established processes for the licensing of SMR projects that utilize a graded approach. During the reporting period, CNSC published REGDOC-1.1.5 and revised REGDOC-3.5.3, Regulatory Fundamentals, both of which expand upon graded approach principles as they would be applied to all CNSC safety and control areas (SCAs). The CNSC also drafted a revised version of REGDOC-1.1.2, Licence Application Guide: Licence to Construct a Reactor Facility, to ensure it is fit for purpose for SMRs, and incorporates graded approach principles. The CNSC also conducted (or is in the process of conducting) pre- licensing vendor design reviews (VDRs) on several different reactor designs.
• Canada has also promoted the goal of international harmonization with respect to licensing SMRs. CNSC has established numerous memoranda of understanding with other nuclear regulatory bodies. During the reporting period, CNSC entered into new memoranda of cooperation with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) and the United Kingdom’s Office for Nuclear Regulation that focus on advanced reactor SMR technologies. During the reporting period the CNSC and U.S. NRC published three joint review reports on SMRs.
• The most recent update to the CNSC’s long-term regulatory framework covers the period from 2019 to 2024 and outlines the regulations and regulatory documents that will be developed or amended during that time for an effective long-term planning of resources.
• In addition to the yearly funding the Government of Canada has agreed to provide nearly $100 million in direct investment to the nuclear industry, starting in 2020, through the Strategic Innovation Fund and Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency.
• During the reporting periods multiple discussion papers, CSA group standards and regulatory documents were published. The CSA Group is Canada’s largest, member-based standards development organization which sets voluntary consensus standards developed by national stakeholders and public interests related to NPPs and other nuclear facilities and activities.
• Multiple licensing decisions were made:
  • Bruce and Point Lepreau operating licences were amended in March 2020;
  • Darlington and Pickering operating licences were amended in April 2020;
  • Bruce operating licence amended in September 2021 (to allow the production of lutetium-177);
  • Darlington operating licence amended in October 2021 (to allow the production of molybdenum-99).
  • Darlington new build licence to construct was renewed in October 2021.
• In addition, at the end of the reporting period, the Commission was considering a decision to renew the Point Lepreau operating licence. Also, OPG planned to submit in late 2022 an application for a licence to construct a new NPP (at the Darlington site.
• In 2019 the CNSC launched a strategic review, called Project Athena, to prepare for anticipated changes to the nuclear industry over the next 5 to 10 years. The industry and the CNSC’s operating environment are experiencing rapid change, with many challenges emerging simultaneously.
• During the reporting period, the CNSC reviewed the potential implications of the uses of disruptive, innovative and emerging technologies (DIET) on the regulatory framework. CNSC staff concluded the NSCA, regulations, regulatory documents (REGDOCs) and industry standards were neutral, and hence accommodating, to the potential employment of DIET.
• Further, all Canadian NPPs have implemented human performance programs that emphasize detection and correction of human error with a focus on monitoring individuals’ behaviors.

LTO Programmes

Several existing CANDU NPPs have undergone major life-extension projects. Currently, long-term operation is being pursued or considered for many of the reactor units at the Canadian NPPs and abroad. Long-term operation activities are identified through a periodic safety review (PSR) and documented in an integrated implementation plan (IIP). CANDU refurbishment typically involves replacement of major reactor components (e.g., fuel channels), along with replacing or upgrading other safety significant systems. Life-extension is being carried out for Bruce A and B, Darlington and Pickering. Each of them has a condition in its licence to operate that requires the licensee to complete the IIP. Any significant changes to the IIP would constitute a change in the licensing basis of the NPP – the licence requires that such changes are subject to the approval of the Commission.

Bruce A and B refurbishment

The Bruce Power long-term operation programme consists of two major parts. The first part is asset management, which involves the maintenance, refurbishment or replacement of equipment during regular maintenance outages to ensure that systems are in good condition until end-of-life. The second part is a set of major component replacement (MCR) outages, during which each reactor is defueled and drained to accommodate the replacement of major components such as fuel channels, feeder tubes and steam generators, along with other equipment that can be replaced only under such conditions. Bruce Power determined the scope of the MCR outages through a PSR conducted for Bruce A and B.

As stated in the 9^th National Report, the asset management portion of long-term operation began on January 1, 2016 and will continue through 2053. The MCR outages began with Unit 6 in January 2020 and will be followed by Unit 3 in early 2023; the activities carried out during these outages will extend the lives of Units 3 to 8 over a period of 13 years. Bruce A Units 1 and 2 have already been fully refurbished and returned to service in 2012. Asset management and MCR outages will allow Bruce Power’s units to operate safely through to 2064.

Darlington refurbishment

Darlington Unit 2 refurbishment commenced in October 2016, and significant progress was made during the reporting period toward completion of the work items in the IIP, which was based on an integrated safety review (ISR – the same process as what is now called PSR).

As stated in the 9^th Review Report, OPG’s refurbishment project at Darlington that began with Unit 2 in October 2016 continued through to June 2020. Completion assurance documents were provided to the CNSC to support removal of each of the Unit 2 “regulatory hold points” and demonstrate successful and safe return to service for Unit 2. Following the return to service, in September 2020, OPG started the lead-in refurbishment activities on Unit 3, with the majority of activities centring around preparing the unit for refurbishment, such as defueling and dewatering the reactor. Refurbishment of Unit 3 is estimated to take until the middle of 2023 to complete. OPG also commenced the refurbishment of Unit 1 in February 2022; at the end of the reporting period, two units were in the process of being refurbished. OPG continues to operate the Retube Waste Processing Building, which resumed volume-reduction activities in mid-2021, for wastes generated from refurbishment of its reactors (i.e. fuel channel end fittings, pressure tubes, and calandria tubes).

Pickering extended operation

Pickering Nuclear Generating Station’s Units and 4 were refurbished and returned to service in 2005 and 2003, respectively. In 2010, Units 2 and 3 were each placed in a safe storage condition, which involved defueling and dewatering the reactors, isolating these units from the operational part of the station (i.e., containment) and placing the units in a state that prevents start-up. Some Unit 2 and 3 systems remain operational, providing common system support to the operation of Units 1 and 4. Units 2 and 3 will be maintained in safe storage states until the entire NPP is shut down for eventual decommissioning.

As highlighted in the 9^th National Report, OPG had decided not to refurbish Pickering Units 5-8, which have fewer years of service than Pickering Units 1 and 4. OPG developed a sustainable operations plan for all operational Pickering Units (1, 4 and 5 to 8) for the approach to the end of commercial operation. During the previous reporting period, as part of the renewal of the licence to operate Pickering, OPG obtained authorization from the Commission to operate up to December 31, 2024 followed by a transition to safe storage by the end of the licence period (2028). OPG was required to inform the CNSC prior to December 31, 2022 of an intent to operate any unit beyond 2024.

In August 2019, OPG evaluated its shutdown sequence and identified that extending commercial operation of Pickering Units 5-8 (formerly known as Pickering B) to December 2025 would enable the facility to further optimize the shutdown and safe storage in a safe and effective manner. In support of extending commercial operation for Units 5-8, OPG planned to reassess the PSR to confirm that the design, condition and operation of Pickering supports an additional year of commercial operation. A formal submission requesting the operational extension will be given to the CNSC and will require approval from the Commission. Since that time OPG is studying feasibility of long-term operation of Pickering Units 5 to 8.

Transition to decommissioning of Gentilly-2

During the previous reporting period, Gentilly-2 was in the dormancy and fuel transfer phase, planned from 2015 to 2020. Activities consisted of completing the transfer of spent fuel stored in the irradiated fuel bay to the dry storage facility at the NPP’s secure site. Two further storage units were built to store all the spent fuel currently in the pool.

In December 2020, Gentilly-2 completed the transfer of all its irradiated fuel into CANSTOR modules for dry safe storage. Other main activities planned for this phase are the establishment of a programme for preventive maintenance; aging management of SSCs; and environmental monitoring. The fuel will remain on the Gentilly-2 site until Hydro-Québec begins transferring it, in 2048, to the site identified by Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization. The transfer to this site is planned for completion in 2062. Hydro-Québec foresees that the NPP will be dismantled between 2057 and 2062, and that restoration of the site will be completed by 2064 followed by environmental monitoring between 2064 and 2074. In light of the progress of this transition, Gentilly-2 is now fully subject to the peer review conducted under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Therefore, Gentilly-2 is largely excluded from the peer review associated with the CNS.

New-build developments

During the reporting period, Canadian interests have been involved in various efforts to develop and design SMRs. The concepts vary significantly in size, design features and cooling types and could potentially be sited in places quite different from past NPP projects (e.g., in small and isolated communities). Besides potentially serving different electricity markets and enhancing grid stability, they may have uses beyond electricity generation, such as hydrogen production, desalinization and industrial or district heating. During the reporting period, a number of technology developers and potential proponents continued to express interest in the possible deployment of SMRs in Canada. In 2018, Natural Resources Canada convened the SMR Roadmap process to engage stakeholders in order to better understand their views on priorities and challenges related to the possible development and deployment of SMRs in Canada. Over ten months, an engagement process was led by interested provinces, territories, and power utilities with industry and potential end users, including Indigenous and northern communities and heavy industry. The stakeholder-led report of the SMR Roadmap was released in November 2018 and can be found online. In order to maintain a strong degree of regulatory independence from industry sector discussions, CNSC participation in the SMR Roadmap initiative was limited to observations of the discussions and providing clarifications on regulatory topics and issues.

Darlington New Nuclear Project

In 2006, OPG applied for a licence to prepare site for future construction of NPPs within the existing boundary of the Darlington site. Subsequently, in 2009, as part of the environmental assessment (EA, the term used when the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 was in force) process, OPG submitted an environmental impact statement with supporting documentation to apply for a licence to prepare site. A joint review panel (JRP) was appointed to consider, which concluded in 2011 that the project was not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.

As stated in the 9^th National Report, in August 2012, the Commission issued OPG a 10-year licence to prepare a site for the DNNP. In subsequent years, OPG pursued several work activities with long- lead-times to fulfil OPG’s commitments made during the EA and licensing process. In October 2021, the Commission renewed OPG’s licence to prepare site for a 10-year term. In December 2021, OPG announced it would be working with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to deploy an SMR at the DNNP site, using the BWRX-300 design. OPG intended to submit an application in late 2022 for a license to construct.

SMR Development at Chalk River

In March 2019, Global First Power submitted an application for a licence to prepare site for an SMR on AECL’s property at Chalk River Laboratories. The project involves the deployment of a 15MW(th) high-temperature gas-cooled reactor using the Micro Modular Reactor (MMR TM) technology developed by Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation. The project is currently undergoing regulatory review and an EA. The project is expected to commence operation in 2026, following receipt of all required CNSC licences.

3.2 Safety Improvements for Existing Nuclear Power Plants

The Country Group took note of the following implemented and planned safety measures for existing nuclear power plants in Canada.

According to the 8^thReport the Country Group took note of the following implemented and planned safety measures for existing nuclear power plants in Canada:

• Refurbishment of Darlington and integrated implementation plan (IIP)
• PSR update for Pickering’s extended operation and IIP
• Completion of PSR for Bruce A and B and asset management
• Ongoing improvements to deterministic safety analysis
• Completion of full-scope PSAs at all operating NPPs and methodology development for whole- site PSA
• Installation of a portable HVAC and filtration system for the secondary control area at Point Lepreau

As noted in the 9^thNational report, numerous other safety improvements were made at the Canadian NPPs during the reporting period, including:

• refurbishment of Darlington Unit 2 and commencement of refurbishment of Unit 3
• replacement of major components (fuel channels, feeder piping and steam generators) in Bruce Unit 6
• installation of a passive containment filtered venting system at Bruce A and Bruce B
• diesel fire pump replacements, as well as installation of a portable heating, ventilation, air conditioning and filtration system for the secondary control area at Point Lepreau
• PSR update for Pickering’s extended operation and IIP.
• completion of PSR for Bruce A and B and asset management
• ongoing improvements to deterministic safety analysis
• completion of full-scope PSAs at all operating NPPs and methodology development for whole- site PSA
• multiple safety culture self-assessments and other safety culture activities were conducted and implemented by the licensees of the operating NPPs

A major emergency exercise, Huron Endeavour, was conducted at Bruce in October 2022

Detailed lists of modifications at Darlington, Pickering, Bruce A and B and Point Lepreau to respond to and mitigate beyond-design-basis accidents and severe accidents were provided in the 9^th National Report.

3.3 Response to International Peer Review Missions

The Country Group took note of the following implemented or planned measures in response to the results of international peer review missions:

• In June 2019, during the previous reporting period, Health Canada invited the IAEA to undertake an Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) for Class I facilities (NPPs) in Canada. The mission took place in June 2019 and involved a range of federal, provincial and municipal emergency preparedness and response stakeholders, as well as the NPP licensees. It focused on arrangements for emergencies at Class I nuclear facilities, including the NPPs in the provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick. The mission presented Canada with 6 suggestions, 6 recommendations and 5 good practices (Streamlined process for timely submission and processing of claims after a nuclear or radiological emergency, including a fully accessible web platform; the implementation of the arrangements for pre-distribution of KI pills maximizes the public awareness and the effectiveness of the protective action; the Warden Service in New Brunswick is an innovative approach to help ensure that relevant information is provided to the public during the preparedness stage; the use of social media simulators in exercises has enhanced the ability of response organizations to respond to misinformation and completion of a self-assessment prior to EPREV mission). Canada accepted all the findings from the EPREV mission and has been developing an action plan to address the recommendations and suggestions. A follow up mission has been confirmed for June 2023.
• Canada hosted its second IRRS Mission in September 2019 to review elements of its framework for safety and its core regulatory processes. The report provided valuable insights to the CNSC and other Canadian federal departments and resulted in Canada being presented with 6 good practices, 16 suggestions and 4 recommendations, some of which have already been addressed. Several of the suggestions were not directly relevant to NPPs, and several others were not accepted by Canada. The first recommendation was regarding the Canadian radioactive waste management policy framework, which is discussed further in the seventh Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The second recommendation was related to establishing dose constraints for all Class I facilities, which is being addressed during the development of REGDOC-2.9.2, Controlling Releases to the Environment. The third recommendation was related to consistency of radiation protection requirements, which has been addressed by the recent revision to the Radiation Protection Regulations (see article 15). The final recommendation was related to the revision of guidance for package design certification applications. This will be addressed through a revision to CNSC regulatory document RD-364, Joint Canada-United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages, which is expected to be published in 2023.

  As mentioned, several of the suggestions were not directly related to NPPs. However, those that were relevant covered topics such as ensuring qualified and competent staff to regulate existing facilities as well as emerging technologies; consolidation of safety policies into a single document; the formalization of inspector exchanges between sites and ensuring the objectivity and independence of on-site inspectors. The CNSC will be addressing these suggestions through various initiatives and the formalization of existing practices.

  The IRRS mission also acknowledged several good practices of the CNSC that pertain to NPPs, such as: having a comprehensive system for collecting, analysing and sharing regulatory experience feedback; commitment to ensuring a high level of transparency and openness with the public.

  Regarding Openness and Transparency: CNSC has a mandate to disseminate scientific, technical and regulatory information to all stakeholders, there are SNSC outreach programs, Participant funding program, public participation during CNSC hearings or meetings held in Ottawa or legal communities, extensive licensee programs for proactive disclosure and public information program, licensees make their regulatory information incl environmental monitoring results available through corporate websites and social media – the latter is used to disseminate information. stakeholders and interested parties about its regulatory activities and decisions; proactively developing extensive guidance and processes to assist potential applicants to determine the content of SMR licence applications.

  An IRRS Follow-up Mission is planned in 2024.

• Six WANO peer reviews were conducted during the 9^th reporting period at Bruce A and B (together), Bruce A, Bruce B, Darlington, Pickering and Point Lepreau. The feedback, insights and learning from the WANO peer-review process were highly valuable and helped drive major improvements. Further WANO peer reviews are planned in Canada during the next reporting period.
• Operational Safety review Team (OSART) was performed at Pickering in 2016 where three good practices were identified: Obsolescence management that considers long-term aging management assessments; Severe Accident Software Simulator application for supporting multi-unit severe accident management guideline development; Longstanding positive relationship with community partners to develop young leaders and improve environmental stewardship. Follow-up Missions were conducted at Bruce B in 2017 and Pickering in 2018.

Implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS)

On 9 February 2015, the Contracting Parties adopted “Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety” (INFCIRC/872), which is a commitment to certain principles to guide them in the implementation of the CNS’ objective to prevent accidents and mitigate their radiological consequences, should they occur. The Contracting Parties agreed to discuss the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in their National Reports to the 7^th and the subsequent Review Meetings.

Canada reports the following with respect to the implementation of Principle 1 of the VDNS:

• The Canadian regulatory framework has been aligned with the IAEA safety standards, which themselves have been demonstrated to fulfil the principles of the VDNS. Revisions have been made to the Canadian regulations, regulatory documents and standards in the areas of siting, design and construction in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima and other operating experience.
• CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants, sets out requirements and guidance for the design of new, water-cooled NPPs. To a large degree, REGDOC-2.5.2 represents the CNSC’s adoption of the tenets set forth in the IAEA safety standards SSR-2/1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, and the adaptation of those tenets to align with Canadian practices.

Canada reports the following with respect to the implementation of Principle 2 on safety improvements to existing nuclear power plants of the VDNS:

• The designs of existing Canadian NPPs, which are all CANDU reactors, include features that prevent accidents and mitigate impacts should an accident occur. In addition, actions by the CNSC and licensees have strengthened defence-in-depth and enhanced emergency response. New reactors would meet the latest requirements for siting, design, and construction.
• Licensees have implemented updated safety analyses and safety analysis reports that align with the requirements in revised CNSC regulatory documents. Also, licensees are meeting their safety goals associated with probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs). Through verification of analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection, Canadian NPPs have been shown to meet design and safety requirements as well as the operational limits and conditions necessary for meeting the VDNS principles. Finally, considering the ageing of Canada’s fleet of reactors, NPP licensees have established and implemented rigorous ageing programmes with the objectives of preventing accidents and should one occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides.
• Canada fulfils principle 2 through performance of both global and specific assessments.
• Integrated safety reviews (ISRs) for the refurbishment of specific NPPs have been completed. The CNSC has introduced PSRs (the same as ISRs, but periodic) for 10-year operating licences, which will enhance the systematic adoption of safety-related improvements of NPPs as requirements evolve.
• NPP licensees have completed PSRs (and/or ISRs) that are based on regulatory documents and industry codes and standards. The PSR process includes improvement plans to systematically execute safety improvements that address gaps found during the PSR. The IIPs have included significant safety upgrades when practicable – these have been completed during refurbishments, maintenance outages and other activities.
• Besides design changes that have been made to address new standards, on an ongoing basis through the application of ISR and PSR, licence renewal and amendment are also used to implement new requirements that were not addressed through PSR (e.g., those related to safeguards).
• The Operators have continued the reporting period with various modifications relating to additional provisions for make-up water and strengthening defence in depth Canada reports the following with respect to the implementation of Principle 3 of the VDNS:
• The National Report shows how IAEA safety standards continue to serve as guiding principles for the Canadian regulatory framework, which is applicable to both existing NPPs and new- build projects. The suite of CNSC regulatory documents and CSA Group standards incorporate the content of a significant number of IAEA publications as references, and also refer to additional IAEA publications for supporting material.

Canada reports the following enhancements to its regulatory framework for the design, siting and construction of new nuclear power plants:

• The Canadian regulatory framework has been aligned with the IAEA safety standards. Revisions have been made to the Canadian regulations, regulatory documents and standards in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima and other operating experience. Processes are in place to apply the regulatory framework for any new NPPs that may be site, built, and operated.

Canada reports the following planned activities related to the principles of the VDNS:

• The development of design and operational requirements related to new-build (e.g., SMRs), will continue in the next reporting period with the aim of further fulfilling Principle 1 of the VDNS.
• Significant safety upgrades will continue for the existing NPPs in the next reporting period as part of the extensive long-term operation and refurbishment programs.
• The maintenance and improvement of the regulatory framework, including both CNSC REGDOCs and CSA Group standards, will continue through well-established processes in the next repotting period as part of systematic revisions to existing documents and development of new documents.

The Country Group discussed the following topics:

• Site evaluation and site licensing for SMRs
• Definition of SMR
• The need to revise regulatory framework due to SMRs
• Regulatory experience of major component replacements
• Human factors engineering
• Public involvement
• Competence requirements for new operator
• Different stakeholders for safety
• Severe accident simulation
• Participation in MDEP (Multi-national Design Evaluation Program)
• Implementation of IRRS findings
• Pressure tube aging management
• Application of PSA for site evaluation
• Cooperation with other governmental agencies including for inspections
• Research activities with regard to hydrogen in the pressure tubes
• Independent safety oversight at the licensee
• PSA for multi-unit exercises and acceptance criteria for CDF and LERF
• Use of PSR in safety improvements in ageing management
• Reactions from the public regarding the situation in Ukraine
• Hydrogen equivalent update in pressure tube
• Regulatory OPEX provided through international collaboration such as the CANDU Senior Regulator’s Meetings.

5. Results of the Review

5.1 General Quality of the National Report

Contracting Parties and officers were invited to provide general comments on Canada’s implementation of the obligations of the CNS (e.g., report submitted on time); whether it addressed all articles, addressed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, and addressed all Challenges; the general quality of its National Report; transparency issues; and the compliance with the CNS guidance documents and Major Common Issues identified in the previous CNS Review Meeting.

With regards to the general quality of the 8^th and 9^th National Reports and transparency issues, the members of the Country Group made the following observations:

• The National Reports are qualified to be comprehensive and reader friendly. They provide a lot of detailed information that is useful and interesting both from the perspective of demonstrating the fulfilments of the obligations under CNS and from the perspective of experience sharing.
• The National Reports were in a good quality.

With regards to the compliance with the requirements of the CNS and its Guidelines, the members of the Country Group made the following observations:

• The National Report for the 8^th CNS Review Meeting was submitted on time on the deadline of 15 August 2019.
• The National Report for the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting was submitted on time on the deadline of 5 August 2022.
• The content and structure of Canada’s National Report for the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting complies with the CNS guidance.
• The directions of the Summary Report of 7^th CNS Review Meeting were mostly taken into consideration in the Report for the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting.

5.2 Participation in the Review Process

With regards to Canada’s participation in the review process, the members of the Country Group made the following observations.

In the 8^th CNS Review Cycle, Canada

• posted questions to Contracting Parties.
• delivered answers to the questions of Contracting Parties on time. In the 9^th CNS Review Cycle, Canada
• posted questions to Contracting Parties.
• delivered answers to the questions of Contracting Parties on time.
• delivered its national presentation during the Joint 8^th and 9^th Review Meeting.

5.3 Challenges

The Country Group identified the following Challenge(s) for Canada.

• Challenge 1: Update guidance document Generic Criteria and Operational Intervention Levels for Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response and include guidance on protection strategies and reflect guidance in provincial plans
• Challenge 2: Approve and implement revision of Ontario’s Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan
• Challenge 3: Optimize regulatory capacity and capability to effectively and efficiently assess licence applications for other nuclear technologies
• Challenge 4: Ensure an effective approach between federal departments to provide proponents with certainty related to process and timelines for environmental/impact assessments

5.4 Suggestions

The Country Group identified no Suggestions for Canada.

5.5 Good Practices and Area of Good Performance

During the peer review of Canada’s National Report, the Contracting Parties were invited to recommend Good Practices and to highlight Area of Good Performance.

The Country Group identified the following Good Practices:

• Good Practice 1: Use of License Condition Handbooks and specifically the compliance verification criteria to promote consistency and objectivity of regulatory oversight
• Good Practice 2: CNSC engagement of Indigenous Nations and communities and the public at Commission proceedings and during all stages of regulatory initiatives

The following Area of Good Performance of Canada were commended by the Country Group:

• Area of Good Performance 1: Development and ongoing execution of Canada’s SMR Action Plan through funding policy development, capacity building and research and development.
• Area of Good Performance 2: Publication of discussion papers to solicit early public feedback on regulatory initiatives such as the CNSC’s discussion paper on the regulatory strategy, approaches and challenges associated with SMRs.
• Area of Good Performance 3: The systematic approach for NPP-related knowledge and on the job training for NPP site inspectors in both technology and regulatory processes.
• Area of Good Performance 4: Development of methodology and submission to CNSC of whole- site PSAs for multi-unit NPPs
• Area of Good Performance 5: CNSC readiness to regulate SMRs (Regulatory strategy; Enhancement to regulatory framework for deployment of new technology Capacity building, International collaboration)
• Area of Good Performance 6: Use of models to simulate and depict visual real time severe accident progression to make training and exercises more realistic
• Area of Good Performance 7: Rigorous planning for safe execution of extensive refurbishments, including replacement of major components, of multiple units in parallel.

5.6 Response to the COVID-19 Situation

The Country Group took note of the following information related to the COVID-19 pandemic: Canada reported that the licensees took the following actions to address difficulties from the pandemic:

• The licensees fulfilled their responsibility to safety improvements and continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, although there may have been some delays early in the pandemic while the licensees developed COVID safety protocols to ensure the safety of workers performing the work.
• The NPP LCHs include a requirement for licensees to maintain a business continuity plan. Such plans to provide for essential services through a sustained period with significant employee absenteeism. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, all NPP licensees implemented their business continuity plans. All NPP licensees took measures to ensure that the minimum staff complement was not compromised by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as having all non- essential personnel work from home, restricting access to the NPP, especially the main control room, closing several buildings onsite to allow for cleaning crews to focus on more critical infrastructure, staggering shift changes to minimize the number of staff in the same area, switching rooms for shift turn-over meetings to allow for greater social-distancing and using thermal-imaging cameras to support active screening of staff on-site.
• All NPP licensees initially delayed major activities in order to minimize the number of personnel/contractors onsite. Outages continued to be planned for critical periodic inspections. A major consideration was to ensure the completion of inspections and collection of data to demonstrate to the CNSC the continued fitness for service of critical systems. All rescheduled activities maintained adequate safety margins and were able to demonstrate the acceptable level of fitness for service. Overall, licensees were adequately prepared with their plans for events involving labour and pandemic actions.
• Other industry members also pivoted during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, SNC Lavalin Nuclear implemented various measures to maintain support for CANDU operations, which included an onsite rapid testing programme for employees working from or visiting the offices, a self-health screening programme prior to visits to the offices, the requirement to maintain social-distancing, and to wear face masks in the offices, limitations on the maximum capacity within locations such as conference rooms, working remotely.
• Bruce Power’s training programmes were transformed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Classroom capacity was severely restricted under social distancing requirements and was not sufficient for continuing traditional classroom delivery strategies. A significant amount of knowledge-based training was moved to e-learning or a virtual platform. To maintain worker proficiency, skills-based training in simulator, shop or laboratory settings were prioritized for in-person learning and supported by micro-learning videos.
• During pandemic, Darlington Unit 2 returned to service safely and on schedule following refurbishment.

Canada reported that the CNSC took the following actions to address difficulties from the pandemic.

Regarding the adjustment of compliance verification programme due to the COVID-19 pandemic the following points were noted:

• In March 2020, CNSC suspended all regular NPP compliance verification activities and identified activities that were considered critical in order to support continued safe operation and regulatory decision making. In April 2020, a new procedure to plan and conduct compliance verification activities at NPPs during the COVID-19 pandemic was approved to ensure continued regulatory oversight. This procedure was utilized during the calendar year 2020. It provided direction for the conduct of oversight activities both remotely and onsite, as well as direction on revising the annual compliance plan. The procedure provided a framework for conducting remote oversight activities and enhancing the capabilities of site inspectors to work remotely. In addition to this new procedure, a pandemic-related pre-job brief was developed as additional instruction to be delivered by the site office supervisors to site inspectors prior to performing onsite oversight activities. CNSC staff worked with licensees to provide comprehensive and remote access to site information systems, actual plant data and participation in all key plant management meetings.
• Also, in April 2020, CNSC staff launched a benchmarking exercise with 19 countries about their inspection practices during the pandemic. The CNSC received responses from 16 countries, including France, the USA and the United Kingdom. CNSC considered this information during the development of its own procedure on planning and conducting inspections during the pandemic and during the revision of its inspection pre-job briefing.
• In May 2020, onsite oversight activities resumed at NPPs in a modified capacity. These activities focused on general health and safety issues, as well as licensee’s adherence to their pandemic response plans and COVID-19 health protocols. The CNSC has made adjustments to the way oversight is conducted. For example, CNSC staff have utilized remote video- conferences to make sure that the presence of specialists during inspections can continue and to conduct the documentation portion of an inspection via desktop inspection. All licensee safety and health procedures are being followed by CNSC site inspectors. CNSC staff continue to conduct oversight activities during the pandemic to ensure the protection of the environment, and the health and safety of people.
• On March 15, 2020, the CNSC activated its business continuity plan in response to the pandemic. Effective March 16, 2020, all CNSC staff in Ottawa and at regional and site offices were directed to work from home. The CNSC made significant efforts to enable its workforce to work remotely including the procurement of tablets, the expansion of remote server capacity, and the leveraging of video conference software. All CNSC employees were asked to avoid non-essential travel outside of Canada. Those returning from outside of Canada were directed to self-isolate for 14 days. The CNSC recommended the adoption of a variety of self-care practices to its employees in order to promote mental wellness. Employees were also required to disclose to the CNSC, per Part II of the Canada Labour Code, if they had tested positive for COVID-19. The CNSC developed a plan for the return to the workplace using the guidance from the public health authorities, based on a phased approach while taking into consideration future developments.

Canada identified the following lessons learned [or areas for improvement] [or enhancements]:

• Health Canada administers the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP). The FNEP is currently being reviewed with the intention of incorporating lessons learned from the Government of Canada’s response to COVID-19 that are applicable to nuclear emergency preparedness and response.

6. Fulfilment of CNS Review Requirements

The Country Group concluded that: Canada

• Submitted National Reports for the 8^th CNS Review Meeting and for the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting, and therefore complies with Article 5, and in time, following Rule 39 of INFCIRC/573/Rev.6.
• Attended the Joint 8^th and 9^th CNS Review Meeting, and therefore complies with Article 24.1