Safeguards and non-proliferation

The CNSC implements regulatory programs to ensure that CNSC licensees – and Canada at large – meet the obligations arising from the Canada/International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements, as well as all other measures arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP).

Nuclear non-proliferation involves numerous measures all aimed at preventing the acquisition and spread of nuclear weapons, including minimizing the risk of diversion of nuclear items from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to nuclear weapons development. Through its import/export licensing process, the CNSC takes steps to assure that Canada’s nuclear exports and imports are used solely for peaceful purposes and do not contribute to development of nuclear weapons. The policy requires major nuclear exports to be subject to a legally binding Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) between Canada and an importing country. Safeguards refers to the measures taken in accordance with the NPT by the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to the development of nuclear weapons.

In this category you will find research and technical information about safeguards practices and verification technology, nuclear material accountancy, and import and export of nuclear materials.

Technical papers and abstracts

• RSP-760.1 A Study for the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission on Artificial Intelligence Applications and Implications for the Nuclear Industry
• Technical and Scientific Support Organization Forum – Supporting the Development of Technical and Scientific Capacities in Member States
• Updating the Domestic Compliance Program to Strengthen Canada’s State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
• Practical Considerations for Location Outside Facility Designation and for Efficient Safeguards
• Development of a Comprehensive Safeguards Regulatory Document for the Canadian Nuclear Industry
• New Technologies for Safeguards Implementation: A Case Study for Improving Measurement of Bulk Uranium
• Canada’s Experience with Building and Maintaining Safeguards Capability
• Future of Safeguards: Use of New Information Technologies to Improve Information Exchange Between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency
• Safeguards for New Types of Nuclear Facilities and Campaigns in Canada
• Performance Management for Safeguards Implementation
• Discrimination of uranium ore concentrates by chemometric data analysis to support provenance assessment for nuclear forensics applications
• An Incremental Machine Learning Algorithm for Nuclear Forensics
• Establishing and advancing electronic nuclear material accounting capabilities: A Canadian perspective
• A nuclear forensic method for determining the age of radioactive cobalt sources